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Introduction 
From Bureaucracies to Networks 
During the last 40 years, the public sector has passed through considerable evolution. After a 
hundred years of hegemony of the traditional Public Administration paradigm (Osborne 2010) and the 
use of hierarchies and bureaucracies for policy design, policy implementation and public service 
delivery, the governance structures and practices in the public sector have shifted towards new logics 
that direct the way the public sector is functioning. That evolution has been marked by three distinct 
paradigms, namely the traditional Public Administration, the New Public Management and the New 
Public Governance paradigm.  
At the core of these distinct paradigms lie varying resource allocation mechanisms, namely 
hierarchies, markets and networks, which imply varying practices to organize and coordinate policy 
design, policy implementation and public service delivery. While the traditional Public Administration 
model was built on the vertical integration of units, the emphasis was placed on formal rules and written 
procedures, which provided the bases for resource allocation through hierarchies embodied by 
bureaucracies. In the ideal-typical bureaucratic model, the public sector was the sole provider of public 
services and responsible for the implementation of public policy. As a field of practice, the model 
reached its peak after World War II, when the state was expected to meet all social and economic needs 
of their citizens, “from the cradle to the grave” (Osborne 2010: 3). During the so called “welfare state” 
era, the traditional Public Administration model was the instrument to satisfy citizens needs and ensure 
equality of treatment. However, by the end of the 1970s this model reached its capabilities as public 
needs outstripped the resources available. Consequently, the traditional Public Administration model for 
policy implementation and service delivery became subject of criticism, first by academics and later by 
political elites. This criticism ultimately paved the way for the rise of the New Public Management 
paradigm (ibid.). 
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The spread of the New Public Management paradigm was grounded on a new discourse of policy 
implementation and public service delivery. That discourse claimed the superiority of private sector 
management techniques over those of the bureaucratic model, based on the assumption that the 
application of managerial techniques will automatically lead to efficiency and effectiveness gains in the 
public sector (ibid.). Stemming from neo-classical economics and rational choice theories, New Public 
Management is concerned with a disaggregated state, where the processes of policy making and 
implementation are disengaged. Policy implementation and service delivery is then achieved through 
numerous independent service units that are ideally competing with each other. Hence, markets, quasi-
markets and contracts are the basis for resource allocation in a horizontally integrated public sector. Due 
to its focus on independent but competing service units, NPM models the implementation of policies and 
the production of public services as an intraorganizational process that turns inputs into outputs within a 
mediating environment (ibid.). Thus, the efficiency of intraorganizational processes, that need to be 
managed appropriately, becomes paramount to the success of public sector organizations. While the 
process of policy implementation and service delivery remained a black box in the traditional Public 
Administration model, NPM provided an understanding of the management of these subprocesses inside 
that black box. However, the focus on intraorganizational management processes, the neglect of the 
specific public sector context and the adherence to outdated private sector practices in an increasingly 
plural, fragmented and interorganizational environment has led to a great amount of criticism of New 
Public Management in the scientific community during the 1990s (Osborne 2010; Meier 1997; Rhodes 
1997).  Osborne (2010) has argued that both approaches, the traditional Public Administration model and 
New Public Management, have begun be partial theories, as both approaches fail to capture the 
complexity of the design, delivery and management of public services nowadays. These critiques have 
led to an evolution of public administration scholarship and practice towards the New Public 
Governance model.   
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Unlike previous approaches to policy design and implementation, the New Public Governance 
model is concerned with the institutional and external environment pressures that enable and constrain 
policy implementation and public service delivery in a plural and pluralist state, i.e. where multiple 
interdependent actors with varying value bases contribute to the implementation of policies (Osborne 
2010). Originating from institutional and network theory, the focus of the New Public Governance 
model lies heavily on interorganizational relationships and the governance of processes, emphasizing 
service effectiveness that relies upon the interaction of public service organizations with their 
environment (ibid.). Consequently, the general resource allocation mechanisms in the NPG model is the 
interorganizational network. It is important to remark that such interorganizational networks are rarely 
cooperative systems of equals, but are rather systems with significant power asymmetries that must be 
taken into account for a network to function (Provan and Milward 1995; Osborne 2010). Therefore, the 
value base in such networks is often dispersed and contested, contrary to the traditional Public 
Administration and New Public Management model, where the values bases are rather uncontested and 
lie on the public sector ethos or on the efficacy of competition and the marketplace respectively 
(Osborne 2010). In this sense, Osborne attested that NPG is both “a product and a response to the 
increasingly complex, plural and fragmented nature of public policy implementation and service delivery 
in the twenty-first century” (Osborne 2010: 9). Thus, as public administration evolved from a 
hierarchical model of governing, typical for the traditional Public Administration regime, to a 
governance based model, where private and non-profit organizations increasingly participate in the 
design, formulation and implementation of public policy, hierarchies between public and private entities 
have been replaced with rather horizontal partnerships, in which the participants are partners in 
achieving effective outcomes (Mandell 1999a).   
During the latest stage of that evolution, the NPG era, networks were increasingly established to 
solve so-called “wicked” problems in areas such as urban development, health, social care and education 
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(Turrini et al. 2010). Scholars have argued that in complex, plural and fragmented societies, networks 
ought to achieve more effective policy outcomes by using participative approaches (Agranoff 1992; 
Mandell 1999b; Milward and Provan 2003). Nowadays, networks are being used to take decisions and 
pursuit political agendas through policy networks, to find solutions for complex societal problems and 
value conflicts through deliberation in governance networks and finally to ensure adequate satisfaction 
of citizens’ need through service-delivery networks. In an influential literature review on the 
determinants of public network performance, Turrini and colleagues have argued that: “In the public 
sector, the implementation and management of public programs through networks has now become more 
the rule than the exception. The prevailing view among many service professionals, policy-makers, and 
researchers, is that, by integrating services through a network of providing agencies, clients will gain 
benefits of reduced fragmentation and greater coordination of services leading to a more effective 
system and, thus, more positive outcomes” (Turrini et al. 2010: 528).   
Hence, scholars, experts and policy-makers see public networks as an effective way of delivering 
services to the public and solving complex societal problems as well as value conflicts, due to reduced 
fragmentation and improved coordination among involved organizations. However, performance 
concerns draw increasing attention of scholars, as euphoria towards the formation of public networks 
quickly gave way to doubts about whether networks in the public sector really work. Consequently, 
many scholars started to assess network performance and identify its predictors, but with controversial 
results. In fact, the literature on public networks has been highly fragmented due to a diversity of 
definitions, various approaches and a variety of mostly monocausal explanations for public network 
performance (Turrini et al. 2010). While there have been increasing efforts by scholars to shed light on a 
plethora of factors that affect network performance (for a review see Turrini et al. 2010), they have 
rarely investigated the possibility of these factors having a combined effect on network success. 
Although the literature provided a broad variety of determinants affecting public network performance, 
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ranging from contextual, structural, functioning and managerial characteristics, it was lacking a 
satisfactory model that tries to unwrap the complex causality among these characteristics and their joint 
effects on network performance.  
Considering that the NPG model emphasizes the structure of interorganizational relationships and 
the practices of governance among networked organizations, this represents a real gap in the literature.  
That gap in the literature and a certain dissatisfaction about the predominance of studies with 
monocausal explanations regarding the determinants of public network performance, a rather complex 
issue, can be seen as the starting point of the following three studies. In particular, moving on from 
Turrini et al. (2010) and the authors’ invitation to explore whether an interaction effect among the 
determinants of network performance can be supposed, a first study explored the possibility of multiple 
and equifinal combinations of determinants positively affecting interorganizational network 
performance. In an exploratory case study, investigating on four service-delivery networks in 
Switzerland and comparing the joint effects of network governance, coordination mechanisms and the 
abilities of the network management, it was found that success can be achieved in networks in a shared-
governance system through the simultaneous presence of formalized coordination mechanisms and a 
group of “network administrators” establishing and maintaining network rules and procedures (Cristofoli 
et al. 2014b).  
While most studies conducted on the performance of public networks have stressed the paramount 
importance of network management and leadership for success of interorganizational networks in the 
public sector (Kickert et al. 1997; Koopenjan and Klijn 2004; Meier and O'Toole 2001; Agranoff and 
McGuire 2001; Sørensen and Torfing 2009, among others), the insight that network success can also be 
achieved using bureaucratic practices has shed new light on the joint effects of network structure and 
governance practices. That insight reinforced the starting hypothesis, according to which there are 
multiple and equifinal combinations of determinants based on the structure of the network and ultimately 
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on the power and control relations among network participants. It has also directed the following 
research towards expanding its scope and analyzing conjunctional combinations of contextual, structural, 
functioning and managerial characteristics and their configurational effects on network performance. 
Using a relatively unknown approach, the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), a second study 
examined the complex causality among network context, network structures, formalization and network 
management using 12 networks providing home and social care services to the population. The study 
“How to make public networks really work? A Qualitative Comparative Analysis” has shown that given 
an adequate network context (sufficient financial resources), there are multiple configurations of 
determinants leading to high performance of interorganizational networks in the public sector. On the 
one hand, when the network is governed by a central core agency, network performance seems to depend 
on the simultaneous presence of network management. On the other hand, when the governance of the 
network is shared among the participants, network success seems to depend on the simultaneous 
presence of formalized coordination mechanisms defining partner interaction. That is due to the varying 
complexity of the structure of interorganizational relationships amongst network participants. Networks 
integrated by a central core agency operate in a context where the governance structure provides 
significant power asymmetries. These power asymmetries occur either through core providers assuming 
a leading role in the network bolstered by their central position in the flow of clients and key resources, 
or through inception by legal authorities that establish a Network Administrative Organization to 
coordinate and sustain a network (Provan and Kenis 2008). In such situations, public networks tend to 
rely less on formalized mechanisms and allow the top management to steer and nurture the network with 
their managerial abilities. Decentralized networks with multiple centers of power, tend to be more 
complex with various powerful network participants sharing the task of governing the network by taking 
a bureaucratic approach in order to organize, coordinate, and direct network participants towards a 
common goal in accordance with established rules and procedures. The scope for managerial 
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intervention is then reduced to a minimum, while the reliance on formalized coordination mechanisms 
becomes a governing principle (Cristofoli and Markovic 2014). 
Following the idea of multiple configurations of key determinants, which have to be combined in a 
meaningful manner in order to foster network performance, a third study developed and tested the notion 
of logically coherent organizing principles that are contingent upon the network structure in place. In the 
paper “Contingencies and Organizing Principles in Public Networks” various hypotheses regarding the 
configurational nature of these organizing principles were tested using Exploratory Factor Analysis and 
OLS Regression on 265 surveys that have been completed by members of the 523 health and social care 
networks in Switzerland. The obtained results confirm on large scale what has been hypothesized based 
on the previously conducted studies: There are multiple, logically coherent organizing principles within 
successful interorganizational public networks. One organizing principle, i.e. the formal definition of 
relationships, roles, responsibilities, boundaries and communication channels (in short the bureaucratic 
coordination of common efforts) has shown to have positive effects in decentralized networks settings, 
while another organizing principle, the use of managerial activities to organize and coordinate the 
activities of network participants has shown positive effects on network outcomes in a setting in which 
the “power and control structure of a network” (Provan and Milward 1995: 10) is organized around one 
focal organization. Furthermore, there is evidence that breaking with the inherent logics of each network 
might affect network performance negatively, as the excessive application of network management and 
leadership activities in decentralized network settings is negatively related with network performance 
(Cristofoli and Markovic 2015).  
The three conducted studies have incrementally improved the understanding of the joint effects of 
network context, the structure of interorganizational relationships and the governance practices applied 
in order to organize and coordinate the common efforts of networked organizations. They also show that 
a network, despite being a distinct resource allocation mechanism, makes use of practices typical for 
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hierarchies and markets. Therefore, the irony of networks is constituted by the fact that networks provide 
a flexible governance system that allows for vertical integration, bureaucratic means of organization and 
managerial steering, which in turn allow networks to be successful, if coherently applied.      
In the following chapters, each study conducted for this dissertation will be presented to the reader, 
chronologically from the first exploration of the topic to the large-scale test, which has been developed 
based on incrementally created insights from previous stages. Each chapter follows a similar structure, 
starting from a theoretical assessment of the literature and the development of hypotheses, to an 
introduction of the empirical setting, the method applied and the respective operationalization of 
variables, ending with a presentation and discussion of results. At the end, the cumulated insights will be 
discussed referring back to the three distinct paradigms in public administration, their hybrid features 
that can empirically be found and the irony of networks.  
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Abstract 
This paper compares four cases and explores the effects on network performance of network 
governance, coordination mechanisms, and the abilities of the network manager. The focus is on shared-
governance networks, which are in general considered to have difficulties achieving high-level 
performances. The cross-case comparison suggests a relationship between coordination mechanisms and 
the way shared-governance networks are managed: in order to be successful, they must be able to rely on 
formalized mechanisms and make a pool of “network administrators” responsible for their governance. 
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Introduction 
Scholars only started focusing on network governance methods and exploring their relationships 
with network performance relatively recently. It was in 2008 that the well known article “Modes of 
network governance. Structures, management and effectiveness” by Provan and Kenis (2008) identified 
three different forms of network governance: Shared/Participant governance, Lead Organization 
governance and Network Administrative Organization (NAO) governance. In a subsequent article, the 
authors looked in more detail into the relationships among these governance forms and network 
performance, arguing that the appropriateness and success of different governance forms can vary in 
different circumstances (Kenis and Provan 2009). Shared-governance forms in particular are considered 
to have difficulties achieving high-level performances. They are only expected to work well in small, 
geographically concentrated networks where full, active face-to-face interaction between network 
members is possible (ibid.). Our paper aims to contribute to the literature on the topic. Following the 
lead of Kenis and Provan (2009), it will focus on shared-governance networks and examine the key 
factors making them successful. “How to be successful in shared-governance Networks” is the central 
research issue in our study.  
We took the literature on service-delivery networks as our theoretical framework (Turrini et al. 
2010) and identified two categories of predictors of network performance: network-coordination 
mechanisms and the abilities of the network manager. We then explored whether coordination 
mechanisms and managerial abilities, or a combination of them, can lead to success for shared-
governance networks. Public homecare-assistance networks in Switzerland provided the empirical 
setting for our study. In keeping with the purposes of our analysis, we conducted a multiple case study 
based on four networks with shared governance. The results show that when many players are involved 
in network governance, good performances are only possible if a group of network “administrators” (as 
better defined later) supervises a well-defined set of rules and procedures. 
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Our study contributes on both, a theoretical and a managerial level. In theoretical terms, firstly it 
explores the relationship between network success and different governance structures. The results show 
that coordination mechanisms and managerial abilities do play a crucial part in the success of shared 
governance network, regardless of circumstances like network size and geographical concentration. 
Secondly, our study follows the direction suggested by Turrini et al. (2010) and sheds light on the effects 
of interaction among the predictors of network performance. The results allow us to suppose that 
interaction between coordination mechanisms and managerial abilities leads to network success. Thirdly, 
our study complements the existing studies on the roles and abilities of the network manager. The results 
reveal that in some circumstances, network success may not be reliant on a network manager, or perhaps 
a different role and managerial abilities more similar to those of an impartial administrator might be 
preferable. Fourthly, our paper casts new light on the management-bureaucracy dichotomy in public 
networks.  
The results seem to suggest that as network governance becomes more complex and the degree of 
sharing among multiple players increases, it becomes more and more preferable to comply with existing 
rules and procedures administered by impartial institutional bodies. From a managerial point of view, the 
results of our study seem, thus, to suggest that administering shared-governance networks in a 
bureaucratic way is one of the keys to making them successful. 
The paper is divided into four sections. The first section provides an overview of network 
governance modes and discusses the peculiarities of shared-governance networks. The second section 
reviews the concepts of coordination mechanisms and managerial abilities and presents the theoretical 
framework of the paper. The third section describes the method and presents the empirical setting. The 
last section describes and discusses the results of the study. 
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Modes of Network Governance 
In two articles published in 2008 and 2009, Provan and Kenis (2008) and Kenis and Provan (2009) 
began to shift their focus from the structural characteristics of public networks (Provan and Milward 
1995; Provan and Sebastian 1998; Provan et al. 2005) towards the distribution of governance power 
within network structures, while showing that different network governance forms can lead to varying 
results in terms of network performance.  
The simplest governance form that a network can take is joint governance by the participants. These 
shared-governance networks (or participant-governed networks) consist of multiple organizations that 
work collectively as a network (without any distinct governance entity), take all decisions mutually and 
manage network activities together. The strength of these networks lies in the involvement of all network 
partners and in their flexibility and responsiveness to the needs of the network participants. However, a 
structure of this kind has a negative impact on network efficiency (Kenis and Provan 2009). 
Accordingly, it is more appropriate in small, geographically concentrated networks where full, active 
face-to-face interaction between network members is possible. 
The second network form, the Lead Organization-governed network, is based on the coordination of 
activities and key decisions by a so-called Lead Organization. This organization provides administration 
for the network and facilitates the work of partner organizations as they seek to achieve network goals 
(ibid.). The advantages of this model lie in increased efficiency through easier coordination of network 
activities and greater legitimacy provided by the Lead Organization (ibid.). The weakness is that the 
Lead Organizations often have their own agenda. This can create tensions between the Lead 
Organization and network partners due to their different organizational interests (ibid.). This model is 
common in vertical relationships between buyers and suppliers or between funders and recipients. It can 
also occur in horizontal multilateral networks, most often when one key organization has sufficient 
resources and legitimacy to play a leading role. 
16 
 
The third network form is the NAO model. It is based on the idea of a separate administrative entity, 
which manages and coordinates the network and its activities just like a Lead Organization, but without 
being a network partner. Instead, it provides its services to the network participants. This structure 
allows network organizations to interact and work together while the main activities and key decisions 
are coordinated by a separate, independent entity (Kenis and Provan 2009). The NAO, which can be a 
government entity or a non-profit organization, is often being established with the purpose to govern the 
network. These organizations may have relatively informal structures revolving around single 
individuals who act as network facilitators or brokers, or they may be more formalized and complex 
organizations with a board and a management team. According to Kenis and Provan (2009), the second, 
more formalized approach is very likely to be used when the NAO is seeking official recognition to 
boost its legitimacy among internal and external stakeholders (ibid.). The strengths of this governance 
model are its greater legitimacy, sustainability and efficiency, while its weakness lies in its bureaucratic 
decision-making process (ibid.). NAO governance forms tend to be more suitable for large, highly 
complex networks. 
The abovementioned considerations make it seem apparent that shared-governance networks are the 
simplest governance form, but they appear to have more difficulties achieving high-level performances. 
“How to be successful in shared-governance networks” is the research issue that we will try to address. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
The existing literature provides us with a number of predictors of network performance, ranging 
from the mechanisms for the coordination of the network partners, to the abilities that the network 
manager must have in order to run the network successfully. According to some authors (see Turrini et 
al. 2010), it seems likely that these factors can have a joint effect on network performance. In the 
following section, we will review the existing studies on coordination mechanisms and the abilities of 
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network managers in successful networks, while also presenting the theoretical framework for our study 
(Figure 1). 
 
  Figure 1. Theoretical Framework 
 
 
Coordination Mechanisms in Successful Networks. Many studies have shown that network 
performance can be boosted by formalized coordination mechanisms such as: joint information and 
communication systems; shared marketing, planning or implementation structures; joint staff activities; 
integrated service capacities (e.g. a one-stop entity at the service of network clients); organization of 
meetings; definition of the network agenda; the establishment of rules and laying down rules for 
decision-making (Gray 1989; Kljin 1996; Jennings and Ewalt 1998; Provan and Sebastian 1998; Shortell 
et al. 2002; Conrad et al. 2003; Bazzoli et al. 2003). In public networks in the area of health and social 
services, some of the specific coordination mechanisms that have been successfully introduced include 
case management, project management systems for ongoing care, peer review systems and continuous 
quality improvement systems. Personal and informal contact between network partners based on long-
lasting relationships and a high degree of trust has also been shown to have a positive impact on network 
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performance. Many scholars mention the degree of trust as a crucial factor that influences relationships 
within a network and therefore the network performance, including Ferlie and Pettigrew (1996), and 
Provan and Kenis (2008). 
 
Abilities of the Network Manager in Successful Networks. As public network literature gradually 
developed, scholars left the focus on network structure and mechanisms behind and started to 
concentrate on the abilities of the network manager as predictors of network performance, in the belief 
that managerial skills have an impact on network performance (Kickert et al. 1997; Agranoff and 
McGuire 2001; Mandell 2001; Huang and Provan 2007; Meier and O’Toole 2001) and that in some 
cases they play an even bigger part than the network structure and mechanisms (Kort and Klijn 2011). 
Generally speaking, network management abilities can be split into two broad categories: nurturing the 
network and steering it. Abilities of the former kind are typical of network “facilitators” and 
“mediators”, while those of the latter kind are associated with network “leaders” (Agranoff and McGuire 
2001, 2003; McGuire 2002). In order to nurture the network, the network facilitator/mediator is expected 
to be able to foster an environment for good partner interaction (by creating an institutional structure and 
by establishing working rules to govern partner participation), promote information exchanges between 
network partners, maintain harmony and develop ways to cope with strategic and operational complexity 
(Kickert et al. 1997; Agranoff and McGuire 2001; O’Toole and Meier 2004). Moreover, the 
facilitator/mediator must be able to ease tension among network members in order to strengthen their 
partnerships. This can be done by seeking formal arrangements through bargaining and negotiations, by 
reorganizing the network’s structural processes and by creating governance mechanisms, which align the 
interests of the partner organizations (Kickert et al. 1997). Ultimately, the network facilitator/mediator is 
expected to be able to build commitment to the mission and to the goals of the network not only among 
network members but also among external stakeholders (Agranoff and McGuire 2001). When it comes 
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to steering the network, the network leader is expected to be able to perform three different tasks: action 
planning, activating and re-planning. Action planning consists of establishing clear missions and 
developing focused strategies and measures for the network and for the organization in which the leader 
works (Agranoff and McGuire 1998; Mitchell et al. 2002). Activating consists of selecting the 
appropriate players and resources for the network (Mitchell and Shortell 2000; Agranoff and McGuire 
2001, 2003), tapping the skills, knowledge and resources of others, gaining trust and building consensus 
(Agranoff and McGuire 2001). ‘‘Re-planning’’ consists of altering and repositioning the network 
objectives when important changes occur in the network environment (Shortell et al. 2002). 
 
Method 
Based on the theoretical framework detailed above, our paper tries to explore whether good 
performances in shared-governance networks are a result of coordination mechanisms, the abilities of the 
network manager, or a specific combination of coordination mechanisms and managerial abilities. Due 
to the exploratory nature of the project, we conducted a multiple case study (Yin 1984). 
 
Empirical setting. Public homecare service networks in Switzerland provided the empirical setting 
for our study. We chose Switzerland because it is an information-rich case as far as the collaboration 
between public, private and non-profit organizations is concerned (Steiner 2000; 2003). Due to the small 
size of the Swiss municipalities (only ten of the 2,516 municipalities have more than 50,000 inhabitants), 
collaboration for the delivery of public services is in fact a popular approach in the country: more than 
60 % of the Swiss municipalities are involved in networks for the joint provision of public services 
(ibid.). We chose, then, homecare networks, as collaboration is most widespread in the health and social 
field, with 69 % of the Swiss municipalities involved in networks of this kind (Steiner 2000; 2003).  
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In early 2000, a federal law (which was followed by a series of cantonal laws) was issued to induce 
Swiss municipalities to collaborate when providing ambulant health and social care services for the 
elderly, young families, single parents, disabled persons or other groups that struggle to cope with their 
everyday routines. As a result, “Spitex organizations” were formed (in the form of consortia, foundations 
or associations promoted by Swiss cantons and/or municipalities) to provide services and support to 
citizens who need medical aid, care, supervision, monitoring or advice to increase their capacity for 
living at home.  
Spitex organizations tend to provide some services themselves and activate other non-profit 
organizations to provide ancillary services (such as the transportation of disabled clients, meal services 
for those who are unable to cook, night-time care, oncological care and psychological support), thus 
creating a network of organizations that jointly cater to patients’ needs (hereinafter we will refer to them 
as Spitex networks). The idea behind Spitex networks is that patients should be treated, supported and 
advised by special trained nurses in a familiar environment, in order to increase their comfort, autonomy 
and self-determination. Furthermore, providing these services in the patient’s home is considered to be 
less cost-intensive than treatment in stationary facilities like hospitals or nursing homes. These 
advantages make the homecare services provided to an essential part of the Swiss health and social care 
system. 
According to the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO), there are around 575 publicly entrusted 
Spitex organizations in Switzerland. 540 of them are in 19 German-speaking cantons with 1,585 
municipalities and 5.5 million inhabitants. A further 1,024 municipalities and 2.4 million inhabitants are 
covered by 30 organizations in six French-speaking cantons and six in the Italian speaking canton (Swiss 
Federal Statistical Office 2010). In 2009, Spitex networks served 214,000 patients. 147,000 of them were 
female (69 %) and the vast majority (75 %) of patients were older than 64 years (ibid.). The total number 
of patients amounted to 2.8 % of the Swiss population (Swiss Federal Statistical Office 2010). Spitex 
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networks were able to provide for this 2.8 % of the Swiss population who need social and health care 
assistance with services in their homes, meaning that it was not necessary for them to be treated in 
stationary facilities like hospitals or nursing homes.  
Finally, Spitex networks tend to have a variety of structures and forms of governance, as our 
previous paper shows (Cristofoli et al. 2014a). In addition to networks with a Lead Organization that 
either provides homecare services or activates and coordinates the network partners, there are networks 
in which the governance is shared among all or most of the network partners. This makes Switzerland an 
interesting empirical setting for a focus on shared-governance networks and exploration of the factors in 
their success. 
 
Case Selection 
In order to conduct our analysis, we selected four cases using the following criteria (Table 1): (1) 
four shared-governance networks; (2) two successful and two unsuccessful networks; (3) two larger and 
two smaller networks; (4) two networks operating in concentrated geographical areas and two networks 
operating in more widespread areas. This research design allowed us to investigate the impact of 
coordination mechanisms and managerial abilities on network performance by cross-checking them with 
the network size and geographical concentration, which are key factors behind the success of shared-
governance networks according to the existing literature (Kenis and Provan 2009). Moreover, all 
networks are mandated and have existed for around ten years. This meant that there was no variation in 
“exogenous factors”, which according to Provan and Kenis (2008) and Kenis and Provan (2009) can 
affect network performance. In order to guarantee the anonymity of the selected networks, we will label 
them as Spitex-Blue, Spitex-Indigo, Spitex-Violet and Spitex-Grey. There will be a shorter description 
of Spitex-Indigo, as it has already been described in a previous paper (Cristofoli et al. 2014a).  
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  Table 1. Case Selection 
 Geographical concentration Geographical dispersion 
Larger networks Spitex-Blue (23) Spitex-Indigo (70) 
Smaller networks Spitex-Violet (13) Spitex-Grey (16) 
Bold for successful network; Number of network participants in brackets 
 
The Spitex-Blue network is built around a non-profit association, which was set up to deliver home 
and social care services to the people of one municipality (geographical concentration). It is entrusted 
with the responsibility of providing homecare assistance by the municipality and when necessary it 
activates non-profit organizations to provide complementary services. The resulting network is made up 
of approximately 23 partners (network size = 23 partners). The most important partners, including the 
municipality, the Spitex organization, and major non-profit organizations, have established an inner 
circle, which governs the network through mutual strategic decision-making. The relationships between 
the players within this inner circle feature flat hierarchies and a balance of power. There is no single 
governing entity within the Spitex-Blue network. Instead, it is governed by a subgroup of its participants 
(shared governance). 
The Spitex-Indigo network contains approximately 70 organizations (network size = 70 partners) 
and was created as a result of a merger between two inter-municipal consortia that provided services to 
different geographical areas (geographical dispersion). As shown in a previous paper (Cristofoli et al. 
2014a), Spitex-Indigo is governed by two subgroups, which are responsible for providing Spitex services 
in two different areas. Therefore, it has a fragmented and horizontal structure. There is a balance of 
power between the players within these two subgroups, which mutually define the strategy of the 
network and the operational activities (shared governance). 
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The next network analyzed in this study is the Spitex-Violet network. Homecare assistance in the 
city of Violet was originally provided by more than 40 organizations operating on a district level 
(geographical concentration). However, during the 1990s the Violet municipality issued a law that forced 
the organizations to merge. In the end, only two non-profit associations and one foundation remained. 
These Spitex organizations provide homecare assistance in different districts of the city of Violet and 
operate in a highly integrated way under the direction and control of Violet city council. They work 
together to make joint strategic decisions, define operating procedures for service provision and manage 
joint units offering specific services (e.g. night-time services, preventive counselling and palliative care 
services) for the local community. This approach allows major network partners (i.e. the city, the two 
associations and the foundation) to build a strong and cohesive subgroup with overlapping links. The 
responsibility for governing the network is shared equally among the partners (shared governance). 
Moreover, the two non-profit associations and the foundation can get other non-profit organizations to 
provide complementary services whenever it is necessary, thus resulting in a relatively small network 
with approximately 13 partners (network size: 13 partners). 
Finally, the Spitex-Grey network is built around a non-profit association, which provides health and 
social care services to four municipalities from two cantons. These cantons gave the municipalities the 
responsibility to organize the provision of health and social care services at home. Consequently, the 
municipalities turned to a number of organizations to provide the services. Spitex-Grey evolved through 
mergers between five different Spitex organizations operating in four municipalities (geographical 
dispersion). Nowadays, the network has approximately 16 network partners (network size = 16 partners). 
The most central network partners mutually coordinate activities on a strategic level by deliberating and 
coordinating the interests of the network members (shared governance). 
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Network Performance 
We used a network’s ability to achieve its expected goals as a measure of network performance 
(Provan and Milward 2001). Based on the public assignment of Spitex networks, the Federal Spitex 
Association formulated guiding principles for every Spitex network in Switzerland. Spitex networks are 
asked to treat as many patients as possible, for as long as is medically possible, in familiar surroundings 
in order to support and preserve their autonomy and self-determination by inducing self-help (Spitex 
Association 2011). 
Building on this, we will take the ratio between the patients served in the year 2010 and the 
population in the specific Spitex network area during the same year as a performance indicator. The 
higher the ratio is, the greater the ability of the network will be to achieve its expected results. The more 
patients are served, in fact, the fewer people will be treated in nursing homes, hospitals and other 
stationary facilities, which is directly related to the abovementioned guiding principles and objectives. 
The data about the patients served in 2010 were taken from the annual reports of each Spitex 
organization, while the data about the population in each community in 2010 were based on the 
information about the residential population in Swiss municipalities provided by the Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office. Table 2 shows the performance of each case selected for analysis. 
 
  Table 2. Spitex Network Performance 
Case Performance 
Spitex-Blue 1.2 % 
Spitex-Indigo 3.4 % 
Spitex-Grey 2.2 % 
Spitex-Violet 2.9 % 
Swiss average 2.8 % 
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As revealed by Table 2, the performance varies significantly from network to network. It reaches 
from 1.2 % in the case of the Blue network to 3.4 % for the Indigo network. As mentioned above, the 
Swiss average is 2.8 %, (Swiss Federal Statistical Office 2010), so we can say that two of the networks 
perform below average, while two perform above average. While Spitex-Blue (1.2 %) and Spitex-Grey 
(2.2 %) displayed a below-average performance, the Spitex-Violet (2.9 %) and Spitex-Indigo networks 
(3.4 %) outstripped the average performance in Switzerland. 
 
Data collection and analysis 
To ensure that the qualitative analysis was reliable (Denzin 1978; Denzin and Lincoln 1994), 
different data source and data collection mechanisms were triangulated. Firstly, we collected data 
through official documents that were provided by the government. Secondly, after getting a broad insight 
into each case, a questionnaire was distributed either to the CEO or, if this person was not available, to a 
person working in the management team of the involved organizations. The aim of the questionnaire was 
to collect information about the actors involved, their methods, quality and intensity of collaboration, the 
functioning procedures within the networks and the network management. Thirdly, semi-structured 
interviews with the key players in the Spitex networks were conducted. They were developed through 
the knowledge already acquired based on analyzed documents and the questionnaire. The interviews 
allowed further investigation of aspects emerging from the first two steps and made it possible to gain in-
depth knowledge of every single network. The interviews were conducted either directly at the Spitex 
organization or by telephone and they were transcribed no more than 24 h after each conversation. In 
total, 25 interviews with key actors were conducted. The data were analyzed following three steps of 
data description, analysis and interpretation (Miles and Huberman 1994). At the end of the process, 
relationships showing the joint impact of the network coordination mechanisms and the abilities of the 
network manager on network performance were explored. 
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Findings 
Table 3 shows the results of the case study analysis. As far as coordination mechanisms are 
concerned, the networks analyzed share some similarities, while also presenting important differences. 
There was no remark regarding informal relationships between people to be found, while the reliance of 
the four networks on formalized coordination mechanisms differed significantly.  
 
  Table 3. Results of the Case Study Analysis 
 Spitex-Blue Spitex-Indigo Spitex-Grey Spitex-Violet 
Governance form Shared Shared Shared Shared 
Network size Larger Larger Smaller Smaller 
Geographical 
concentration 
Concentration Dispersion Dispersion Concentration 
     
Presence of formalized 
coordination 
mechanisms 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reliance on the existing 
coordination 
mechanisms 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Presence of a distinct 
network management 
No No No No 
Presence of network 
administrators 
Yes Yes No  Yes 
     
Network performance LOWER HIGHER LOWER HIGHER 
 
In the case of Spitex-Blue, the network partners do not rely on formalized rules to increase the 
liability for any decisions that are made. According to the CEO, “the task group mentioned is 
responsible for defining the network’s goals and the operational activities used to achieve these goals. 
However, so far we have worked without any formal agreements.” In addition, she mentioned that the 
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reliance on formalized rules and mechanisms is very low due to the fact that network meetings were only 
introduced recently and formalized network rules had yet to be established, but the most important 
players are working on institutionalizing and formalizing network relationships. 
The coordination systems in the other three networks seem to place more emphasis on formalized 
network rules, contractual agreements and well-organized network meetings. 
The Spitex-Indigo network relies on formalization to a great extent. Decisions are always made 
during the general meeting or by the executive committee, “as required by law and established in the 
statute” (as quoted in Cristofoli et al. 2014a). Therefore, the decision-making process is strictly based on 
formalized rules. Furthermore, meetings at all levels of the network are scheduled and well planned. 
Meanwhile, the relationships between the different network partners are defined by contractual 
agreements. Accordingly, the relationships between the two subgroups are regulated by a contract, which 
defines their links and their managerial autonomy. 
Similarly, the Spitex-Violet network relies on formalized mechanisms between the most important 
network partners in order to be able to guarantee a common ground and unity in certain aspects. The 
governance of the network by the city council and the two most important Spitex organizations is based 
on regular network meetings (six to seven a year), joint decision-making, and contracts defining joint 
strategic and operative activities, as well as the contribution of every player in the governing subgroup. 
The CEO of one of the Spitex organizations mentioned “monthly meetings with the other non-profit 
Spitex and regular meetings with the city council and the foundation, as well as regular meetings with 
our partners, hospitals and health insurance firms. Doodle is used to set the dates of the meetings”. 
There are also formal contracts with partner organizations that provide complementary services, and the 
various players rely on them a great deal. According to the CEO of one partner organization, “the 
collaboration is based on a contract known as “performance agreement” and there are meetings two or 
three times a year”. 
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Similarly, the Grey network relies on formalization and contractual agreements between key actors 
to a great extent. The CEO of the Spitex organization stated, “contracts are very important for the 
collaboration between the Spitex, the municipalities, the cantons and other non-profit organizations 
which provide complementary services”. These contracts shape the responsibilities and activities of each 
member, as well as the relationships between different members. “We have contracts which lay down 
our competences and responsibilities. These contracts outline our responsibilities and those of partner 
XY, and we have to comply with them” (Spitex-Grey CEO). Furthermore, the meetings for joint decision-
making by partner organizations are well planned and take place on a regular basis (five times a year). 
During these meetings, the contents of agreements are being discussed and altered if necessary: ‘‘they 
[the contracts] have to be adjusted once in a while’’ (Spitex-Grey CEO). Therefore, we conclude that 
there is a high degree of formalization within the network and that formalized network rules are 
important for network activities on a strategic level. 
Apart from coordination mechanisms, we were also able to find some important similarities and 
differences in the four cases in terms of the abilities of the network manager. 
The most notable feature of the Spitex-Blue network in this respect is that the management is left to 
a widespread group of representatives from different organizations forming an institutional body, which 
currently maintains the existing rules and procedures, ensure that the players comply with them and 
therefore facilitate interaction between partners. “It is a responsibility of the official bodies of the 
network partners to discuss strategic goals and increase commitment” (Spitex-Blue CEO). 
The situation in Spitex-Indigo is quite similar. Any disputes among partners are usually resolved by 
the governing bodies (the executive committee or general meeting), without input from the director’s 
office. As the director said, ‘‘there was some tension among network partners about the possibility of 
providing services to children and poor people as well, but that was a matter for politicians rather than 
an issue for the director’’ (as quoted in Cristofoli et al. 2014a). Furthermore, there is no specific actor 
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that is able to facilitate interaction between partners, unify interests or build up the commitment of 
network members. Everything is coordinated and discussed in the general and executive committee 
meetings. Therefore, no clear network manager could be identified. However, many interviewees 
identified the general director, the president and the vice-president of the committee as the main 
characters involved in the “administration” of the network. 
Just as the responsibility for governing the network is shared equally among three major network 
partners in the Spitex-Violet network, three key members seek to promote interaction between the 
partners and ensure the smooth running of the network (the city council and the governing bodies of the 
two Spitex organizations). These players, which at the same time constitute the core of the governing 
subgroups, endeavor to unify interests, ease tensions, and facilitate collaboration among network 
partners. Conflicts are solved by political decisions and interests are only unified when they are in line 
with organizational interests. Furthermore, the city council strives to facilitate collaboration within the 
inner circle of major partner organizations, but the success of this mission is dependent on the 
willingness of each organization. Consequently, there is no unified network management structure in the 
Spitex-Violet network. The following statement by the CEO of one Spitex organization sums up the 
situation among the major network members very well: “The two governing bodies and the city council 
form the core strategic decision-making group in the network. At this level, every partner has a certain 
influence and can bring up its own ideas about future strategic development”. Similarly, according to a 
worker at a partner organization: “The CEO and the board can work together to define and redefine the 
objectives and strategic goals for homecare provision”. 
Spitex-Grey seems to be the only case in which there is neither a person managing the network, nor 
an institutional body ensuring the compliance with the existing rules and formal agreements. “There is 
no member of the network that coordinates or manages the activities of the different organizations”, 
stated the CEO. “Everything is managed on a strictly contractual basis” (Spitex-Grey CEO).  
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Discussion and Conclusion 
The cross-case analysis allows us to give some answers regarding the central research issue: “How 
to be successful in shared-governance networks?” 
Despite their size and geographical concentration, we were able to identify a pattern of factors 
behind the high performance levels achieved by the two successful public networks, namely Spitex-
Indigo (3.4 %) and Spitex-Violet (2.9 %). These shared-governance networks both rely on a well-defined 
and formalized package of coordination mechanisms and the simultaneous presence of a group of 
institutional  to administer them (network administrators). In contrast, the Spitex-Blue (1.2 %) and 
Spitex-Grey (2.2 %) networks lack either the reliance on formalized coordination mechanisms or 
network administrators who can govern the interaction between the partners in accordance with the 
existing rules and procedures. Based on that, it seems possible to argue that the success of shared-
governance networks is ensured by the combination of reliance on formalized coordination mechanisms 
and the presence of network administrators (Figure 2). 
 
  Figure 2. How to be Successful in Shared-Governance Networks 
 
In this context, we can make the proposition that in order to be successful, the more decentralized a 
network is, and the more stakeholders there are in the decision-making process, the more the network 
should rely on a well-defined and formalized package of coordination mechanisms that are implemented 
by a group of network administrators. 
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Thus, we are enabled to contribute to the literature on public networks in the following ways. First, 
the results of our study follow the direction suggested by Kenis and Provan (2009) concerning the 
exploration of network success in relation to different governance structures. In particular, by focusing 
on shared-governance networks, our work complements the existing studies and shows that network 
success is not only affected by the size and geographical concentration of the network. Management 
seems to matter also in shared-governance networks – however, not in the traditional way. Instead, the 
reliance on mechanisms to coordinate partner interaction and the presence of institutional bodies to 
guarantee compliance with the existing rules and procedures seems to lead to success. 
Second, the results of the study have examined in greater depth and enriched the existing literature 
on the roles and abilities of network managers. The function of making partner interaction work, which 
involves institutional bodies, cannot be subsumed under the network manager approaches described in 
the literature review. It seems that besides the already well-defined managerial approaches of 
“facilitator”, “mediator” and “leader” (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; 2003; McGuire 2002), there is 
another approach that is often necessary when running public networks. We label it “the network 
administrator(s)”. In particular, the network administrator(s) can be defined as a group of representatives 
from various organizations. They form interorganizational bodies and maintain well-defined and 
formalized coordination mechanisms as a basis for a procedural decision-making and operating 
processes. These network administrators normally follow impersonal, legislated decision-making 
procedures in order to preserve a balance of power between the major network partners and thus give 
guaranteed stability, accountability and goal attainment in environments characterized by the presence of 
various important network partners. 
Third, the results of our study follow the directions suggested by Turrini et al. (2010), with 
exploration of the interdependence of predictors of network performance. Coordination mechanisms and 
the abilities of network administrators seem to have a joint impact with the network structure on network 
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performance. In particular, coordination mechanisms seem to mediate the relations between shared 
governance and network performance. Regardless of the network size and geographical concentration, 
the key to network success seems to be a combination of reliance on formalized coordination 
mechanisms and the presence of network administrators.  
Fourth, successful shared-governance networks tend to take a more bureaucratic approach in order 
to ensure power sharing and govern the network according to established rules and procedures. Thereby, 
the scope for unilateral managerial intervention is reduced to a minimum, while the reliance on well-
defined and formalized coordination instruments and mechanisms (such as formalized network rules, 
contractual agreements, or well-organized network meetings) becomes a governing principle. The 
establishment and maintenance of these coordination instruments and mechanisms and the establishment 
of power-sharing within the network are the main purposes of the network administrators.  
Finally, the results of our study raised the never-ending issue of the bureaucratization of public 
networks. As described by Bardach (1998), in order to work effectively, shared-governance networks 
seem to need a number of features normally associated with hierarchical organizations. Among them is 
formalization. From a managerial point of view, the results of our study seem to provide those involved 
in shared-governance networks with some suggestions about how to make them work: the greater the 
complexity and involvement of multiple players in network governance, the more preferable it is to 
comply with the existing rules and procedures for partner interaction. 
This study is a preliminary step in a wider research project that aims at exploring the joint effects 
among the predictors of network performance on network success. It provides us with helpful insights, 
but it requires further development. First of all, a quantitative study employing statistical techniques 
could be a useful way of testing the developed proposition. This is the aim of our wider research project. 
Secondly, the concept of network performance may need further work and it might be appropriate to 
create a composite index that considers its multidimensionality. In particular, in mandatory networks 
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involving public and non-profit organizations that are labor-,skill- and knowledge-intensive, it may be 
useful to examine client well-being as compared to measurements such as QALY (quality-adjusted life 
years) or quality of daily living. Thirdly, further insights could come from treating the networks for the 
provision of health and social services as professional networks. In this case, coordination mechanisms, 
project management systems and managerial mechanisms need to be customized in accordance with the 
specific demands of labor- and skill-intensive organizations. 
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Abstract 
Many studies have strived to understand which factors affect the performance of public networks. 
However, very few studies in the field of public management investigate the joint effects of different 
determinants on network performance. This paper uses the relatively new method of Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA) to investigate the complex causality of determinants and network 
performance. It examines the combination of resource munificence, centrally governed network 
structures, formalized coordination mechanisms, network management, and their joint effects on 
network performance. An analysis of 12 Swiss networks providing home and social care services shows 
that there are two possible paths towards network success. Various combinations of the abovementioned 
factors can in fact lead to high network performance. These paths provide insight into how to make 
public networks really work. 
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Introduction 
Ever since Provan and Milward (1995) published their seminal paper on four public mental health 
care networks in the US, scholars in the field of public management have tried to assess whether public 
networks really work and which determinants affect their performance. There have been increasing 
efforts by scholars to shed light on a plethora of factors that affect network performance (for a review 
see Turrini et al. 2010), but they have rarely investigated the possibility of these factors having a 
combined effect on network success (Turrini et al. 2010). 
Exploring this aspect is the aim of this paper. In particular, we are interested in the way that four of 
the predictors of public network performance identified by previous studies (Provan and Milward 1995; 
Kickert et al. 1997; Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Provan and Kenis 2009) combine to enable high 
network performance. These predictors are resource munificence, centrally governed network structures, 
formalized coordination mechanisms and network management. 
A configurational approach, the Qualitative Comparative Analysis, was chosen in order to conduct a 
systematic comparison of 12 home care networks in Switzerland along abovementioned factors and their 
performance, and thereby identify different paths that lead to network success. 
The paper is divided into four parts. The first section reviews the relevant literature for our research 
and outlines the theoretical background on which the research design was based. Following that, there is 
a presentation of the method applied and the empirical setting, along with details of the case selection, 
data collection processes and the operationalization. The third section contains the actual analysis as well 
as its results. Since the QCA follows an iterative approach and constantly goes back and forth between 
empirical cases, theories, and the actual results, the findings will be interpreted in the context of relevant 
theories and cases towards the end of the paper. The results contribute to the existing literature by 
shedding new light on long-standing theories about the joint effects of certain determinants of public 
network performance. 
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This is the latest in a series of three papers exploring the joint effects of different determinants of 
network performance (Cristofoli et al. 2014a; 2014b). In particular, moving from Turrini et al. (2010) 
and the authors’ invitation to explore whether an interaction effect among the determinants of network 
performance can be supposed, the first paper made us more confident about the existence of a 
relationship between network structure, mechanisms and management that jointly affects network 
performance (Cristofoli et al. 2014a). On that basis, the second paper focused on a specific form of 
network governance and showed that success can be achieved in shared-governance networks through 
the simultaneous presence of formalized coordination mechanisms and a group of “network 
administrators” (Cristofoli et al. 2014b). Following these ideas and expanding the scope of previous 
research, the current paper sheds light on various combinations of factors that also lead to network 
success. It thereby confirms and enriches the results of previous studies. First of all, it confirms the 
existence of a relationship between some characteristics of network structure, mechanisms and 
management. Secondly, it confirms the existence of joint dimensions among the abovementioned 
factors: they simultaneously affect network performance. Thirdly, it makes it possible to identify at least 
two different paths leading to high network performance in resource-munificent contexts: the first 
involves centrally governed network structures and network management (facilitating, mediating and/or 
leading), while the second includes shared-governance networks and formalized coordination 
mechanisms. 
 
Literature Review 
The success of public networks is a long-standing theme in public network literature (for example, 
see Mandell 1984; Agranoff 1986; Provan and Milward 1995; Ferlie and Pettigrew 1996; Kickert et al. 
1997; Provan and Sebastian 1998; Mandell 2001; Provan and Milward 2001; Herranz 2009; Kenis and 
Provan 2009). The existing studies usually focus on determinants of network performance without 
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considering the effects of varying combinations of them. The idea of analyzing joint effects of these 
combinations of factors is relatively new to the field (Turrini et al. 2010). In the following literature 
review, we will only focus on relevant studies that suggest configurational relationships among key 
determinants, thus leading us to suppose that there are multiple causal paths for network success and 
allowing us to derive a theoretical framework for the Qualitative Comparative Analysis. 
In their seminal paper, Provan and Milward (1995) identified network context and network structure 
as key variables for network success. They argued that resource munificence is paramount for 
maintaining effective networks, but it is not sufficient to guarantee effective provision of services. 
Therefore, external factors have to be accompanied by appropriate network structures to foster high 
network effectiveness. 
Mentioning network structure as a key determinant of network performance, Provan and Milward 
(1995) were also able to demonstrate a positive relationship between the degree of network integration, 
the degree of network centralization and network performance. They showed that centralized integration 
is a key determinant of network performance, as it will be significantly enhanced, if a network is 
integrated through a central core agency (Provan and Milward 1995). Expanding on the first paper, 
Provan and Sebastian (1998) identified another path towards high network performance, showing that if 
a network is not centrally integrated through a central core agency as proposed by Provan and Milward 
(1995), high network performance is still possible, if networks with widely scattered members are 
strongly integrated by overlapping subgroups (multi-centrally integrated networks) that share 
responsibility for network governance (Provan and Sebastian 1998). 
However, subsequent research revealed that network context and structure alone are not enough to 
guarantee good performance (Raab et al. 2013, among others): the role of coordination mechanisms to 
sustain partner interaction is as well critical for the success of public networks (Brown et al. 1998; 
Jennings and Ewalt 1998; Provan and Kenis 2008; Cristofoli et al. 2014a, 2014b). It is important to note 
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that coordination mechanisms can either be based on well-defined and formalized mechanisms (such as 
formalized network rules, contractual agreements, well-organized network meetings of designated 
representatives, or a highly regulated decision-making process), or on more informal relationships and 
spontaneous agreements between network participants (Provan and Kenis 2009; Cristofoli et al. 2014a, 
2014b). Some scholars have indicated that the effects of formalized network rules, contractual 
agreements and their importance for decision making within a network seem to vary according to the 
level of network integration (Brown et al. 1998; Jennings and Ewalt 1998; Provan and Kenis 2008). 
Therefore, just like with network context and network structure, the literature suggests that coordination 
mechanisms within a network do not have a solely positive nor negative effect on network performance 
per se. Instead, different configurations of certain network structures and varying degrees of 
formalization have varying effects on network performance. 
The same configurational argument seems to be of importance regarding the relationship between 
network management and network structure. In particular, Kort and Klijn (2011) showed that some 
structural characteristics of urban regeneration companies (i.e. functioning at arm’s length from the 
government, having discretionary power, and the tightness of the organization) do not have an impact on 
project outcomes, whereas network management does. Yet, in a previous paper we have shown that there 
is more than one way to manage public networks effectively. It is possible to take a number of different 
approaches, although their suitability depends on the network contexts and (governance) structures. In 
particular, there are multiple ways to manage public networks, either as a network manager (by taking 
the role of a facilitator, mediator or leader) (Agranoff and McGuire 2003) or within a system of network 
“multiple administrators” in the form of institutional and official bodies that run the network by ensuring 
that the partners’ activities comply with the existing rules and procedures (Cristofoli et al. 2014b). 
At the end of this summative review of existing studies, we can identify four key determinants that 
have been broadly claimed to have varying effects on network performance, depending on other 
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determinants accompanying them: resource munificence; centrally governed network structures; 
formalized coordination mechanisms; and network management. Certain network (governance) 
structures, formalized or informal coordination mechanisms and network management systems do not 
have a merely positive or negative effect on public network performance. Instead, it is to be expected 
that adequate combinations of these factors can lead to better network performance. In other words, the 
literature allows us to suppose that there are varying paths to successful public networks that consist of 
different combinations of network governance structures, coordination mechanisms and network 
management. When accompanied by resource munificence, they are expected to have varying effects on 
network performance. In the following section, we will aim to establish which paths, i.e. which 
combinations of these determinants, lead to higher network performance. 
 
Method 
Based on the above made considerations and the results of previous studies (Cristofoli et al. 2014a, 
2014b), we believe that there are varying paths with different combinations of factors, rather than one 
way best way of achieving high network performance. Therefore, our aim is to identify the effective 
combinations among resource munificence, network governance structures, coordination mechanisms 
and network management that lead to network success. Given these aims and the exploratory design of 
this study, we chose the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), which is able to unwrap the 
underlying causal complexity for network success by focusing on the configurational effects of given 
variables, rather than on their single effect on the outcome1.  
                                                          
1 In the framework of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), the determinants, or in other words factors, are named 
“conditions” (Rihoux and Ragin 2009). For coherence with the terminology of the applied method, the term “conditions” 
will henceforth be used instead of “determinants”. A configuration is a specific combination of conditions (or factors, 
stimuli, causal variables or determinants) that produces a given outcome of interest. 
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Criticizing the two dominant research traditions of case- and variable-oriented research strategies, 
Charles Ragin (1987) argued that the assumption of isolated effects of individual variables does not 
make sense, since social phenomena always occur in conjunction with other social phenomena. 
Therefore, the ceteris paribus principle does not aid the understanding of social realities. Furthermore, 
in-depth understanding of a particular case is not fruitful, if no conclusions for other cases can be drawn. 
Ergo, the search for regularities is the central task of research in the social sciences. Hence, it is 
necessary to find a way to combine the strengths of both approaches: identifying regularities while 
preserving context sensitiveness (Rihoux and Ragin 2009). “What makes a certain feature […] causally 
relevant in one setting and not in another is the fact that its causal significance is altered by the presence 
of other features (that is, its effect is altered by context). Similarly, apparently different features can have 
the same effect depending on which other features they are associated with. […] This is a primary 
justification for examining cases as wholes and for trying to decipher how different causal factors fit 
together” (Ragin 1987: 49). More specifically, Ragin rejects the idea of monocausal explanations. 
Instead, he introduced the concepts of conjunctural causation and equifinality. Conjunctural causation 
refers to the fact that certain outcomes are often a result of multiple combinations of conditions 
(probably the rule rather than an exception), while equifinality means that different paths containing 
multiple combinations of conditions can lead to the same outcome (Ragin 1987). Building on these 
propositions, in the late 1980s and early 1990s Charles Ragin developed the Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis in order to combine the strengths of both case- and variable-oriented research traditions and 
bridge the methodological gap between very small N studies, or case studies, and very large N studies, or 
statistical analyses.  
QCA draws on the general principals of analytical induction to employ variables derived from case 
study evidence, but at the same time, it also addresses the primary concern of variable-oriented research 
to observe patterns across cases. Unlike conventional statistical analysis, QCA does not investigate the 
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independent effects of variables on the likelihood of an outcome. Instead, it considers varying 
configurations of conditions and their joint effect on a given outcome (Kitchener et al. 2002). 
Furthermore, when assessing the effects of different conditions on an outcome across cases using QCA, 
researchers are able to identify and distinguish between necessary and sufficient conditions and derive 
conclusions based on assessment of the sufficiency of conditions. 
Three specific techniques can be subsumed under the heading of QCA: Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis using binary data, known as Crisp-set QCA, nominal data, known as Multi-value QCA, and 
continuous data, known as Fuzzy-set QCA (Rihoux and Ragin 2009). In this research, we used a Fuzzy 
Set QCA (fsQCA) (Ragin et al. 2006). The idea behind fuzzy sets is to permit the scaling of membership 
scores and thus allow partial membership in a set (Ragin 2000). While a conventional Crisp-set QCA 
discriminates a case in a dichotomous way, e.g. a network is either centralized or not, a Fuzzy-set QCA 
permits membership scores to range from 0 (full non-membership) to 1 (full membership). Membership 
scores close to 1 (e.g. 0.8) indicate strong but not full membership, while membership scores below 0.5 
but greater than 0 (e.g. 0.2) indicate that objects or attributes are still weak members of the set. The 
crossover point 0.5 is the point of maximum ambiguity. Membership scores are assigned on the basis of 
the theoretical and substantive knowledge gained throughout the research project and they are displayed 
in the “Calibrated Data Table”. The process of defining membership scores for each condition is called 
“calibration”2. Specific fsQCA software is then used to transform the assigned membership scores into 
dichotomized values using Boolean algebra and a specific table (the “Truth Table”) is constructed to 
display them. The Truth Table can be used for logical comparison, with each case being depicted as a 
combination of causal and outcome conditions. The multiple causal paths to a certain outcome are thus 
identified (Kitchener et al. 2002). Using the fsQCA software, more general patterns are obtained through 
                                                          
2 For our research, we used the calibration tool provided by Tosmana software to calibrate membership scores (a software 
that is usually used for crisp sets and multi-value QCA), and fsQCA 2.0 for data analysis. The references can be found at the 
end of this paper. 
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the reduction of conditions with no effect on the outcome. The result of this Boolean minimization 
process is called a “minimal formula”. 
 
Empirical Setting and Case Selection 
The empirical setting for our study was provided by public networks set up by Swiss municipalities 
and cantons to deliver homecare services in Switzerland. At the beginning of 2000, a federal law and a 
subsequent series of cantonal laws induced Swiss municipalities to collaborate in order to organize the 
provision of health and social care services for people in their homes. As a result, Swiss municipalities 
set up specific organizations such as consortia and foundations for this purpose (Spitex organizations). 
These organizations provide some services themselves and activate other non-profit organizations (such 
as the Swiss Red Cross, collaborating nursing homes and collaborating specialized physicians) to 
provide ancillary services like transportation of disabled clients, meal services for those unable to cook, 
night care, oncological care and psychological support. This leads to the creation of a public network 
involving the canton, the municipalities, the established organization (as an administrative and 
professional entity managing the network and providing the majority of the services) and other non-
profit organizations providing complementary services, of which each has its own competences and 
specializations (Cristofoli et al. 2014b). These public networks are called “Spitex networks”. 
Spitex networks support clients of all age groups who need medical aid, care, supervision, 
monitoring or advice in order to live at home while receiving specific treatment or assistance. The idea 
behind Spitex networks is that patients are given the treatment, support and advice that they need by 
specially trained nurses in a familiar environment, in an attempt to increase their comfort, autonomy and 
self-determination. Providing these services at a patient’s home is also considered to be less cost 
intensive than treatment in stationary facilities like hospitals or nursing homes. Home care services have 
thus become an essential part of the overall health and social care system in Switzerland.  
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Within this framework, we selected 12 cases of Spitex networks operating in Switzerland. In order 
to ensure their anonymity, we will label them Spitex A to Spitex L3. Table 1 shows the main 
characteristics of each case. All of them were established at the beginning of 2000 and normally provide 
services like care, household services, meals, nursing homes, transport, but also such services as 
pedicure, hairdressing, social counselling, night care and weekend care. We chose Switzerland as it is an 
extraordinary laboratory for our analysis. As Sager and Rielle (2013: 8f.) pointed out: “Switzerland 
represents an ideal field of investigation for systematic comparative enquiries […] due to its 26 
relatively autonomous cantons, which also vary greatly in terms of their contextual features and internal 
administrative organization.” As far as Spitex networks are concerned, this meant that Swiss cantons 
had plenty of scope when establishing the legal framework for municipalities to choose an organizational 
system for home care services. They could take into account the cantonal, regional, political and cultural 
contexts, fiscal constraints and the different traditions of public service delivery. As a result, Spitex 
networks were implemented with the same purposes and goals, but in varying contextual circumstances 
(i.e. varying degrees of resource munificence) and with varying structural characteristics (i.e. modes of 
network governance).  
As far as contextual circumstances are concerned, the availability of financial resources in the 
external environment significantly varies from canton to canton. In some cantons, the municipalities are 
mainly in charge of the funding; in some, there are splits of varying degrees in funding responsibilities 
between the cantonal and the municipal level, and in others, the canton is the sole source of funds. In 
addition, the assigned public funds (and consequently the degree of uncertainty) vary from around 26% 
in the Canton of Appenzell Ausserrhoden up to 69% in the Canton of Geneva (Swiss Federal Statistical 
Office 2010). The remaining financing comes from the organizations’ own revenues and/or through 
client fees paid for services received, donations and membership fees.  
                                                          
3 Six Spitex networks have already been described in previous studies (Cristofoli et al. 2014a and 2014b). 
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Similarly, as far as structural characteristics are concerned, the modes of network governance vary 
from canton to canton. In some cantons, the government directly activates the actors involved in the 
provision of home care (Spitex and non-profit organizations). In others, the government or various 
municipalities make a focal Spitex organization responsible for providing services, activating other 
actors when necessary, and administering and coordinating the resulting network. In other cantons still, 
the government makes a Spitex organization responsible for providing services, activating other actors, 
administering and managing the network, but the focal organization splits its organizational structure 
into headquarters to administer and coordinate the network, and subsidiaries to provide services and 
activate non-profit organizations when necessary. 
In line with the QCA requirements for good analysis, 12 cases were purposefully chosen in order to 
ensure sufficient variation in the causal and outcome conditions (Rihoux and Ragin 2009). More 
specifically, three criteria were applied in the case selection process. First of all, in order to check for 
effects that could be attributed to economies of scale, we chose networks with a catchment area of at 
least 25,000 people. With this threshold, we restricted our analyses to the biggest 15%. In order to have 
sufficient variation in the causal conditions, we then purposefully chose cases from different cantons, 
with varying public funding (resource munificence) and different structural characteristics (modes of 
network governance). Furthermore, to have sufficient variation in the outcome condition, we chose six 
successful cases and six unsuccessful cases (on the basis of our definition of performance, as described 
in detail below). 
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  Table 1. Selected Cases 
 Spitex A Spitex B Spitex C Spitex D Spitex E Spitex F 
Type Municipal network Cantonal network Regional network Municipal network Cantonal network Cantonal network 
P
u
b
lic
 
F
u
n
d
in
g
 
23.6% Municipality 
20.8% Canton 
44.8% Canton 
32.6% 
Municipalities 
41.9% Municipality 
9.5% Canton 
26.9% 
Municipalities 
26.9% Canton 
69.2% Canton 
S
tr
u
c
tu
re
 
A network built 
around one Spitex 
organization 
operating in the city 
A cantonal network 
covering the whole 
canton and all of its 
municipalities 
A network set up by 
four municipalities 
from two different 
cantons to provide 
services in the 
border region 
between the 
cantons 
Three Spitex 
organizations at the 
centre of a network 
covering the city, within 
the boundaries of 
different districts 
A cantonal network 
consisting of eight 
different regional 
associations/ 
foundations 
covering the whole 
canton and all of its 
municipalities 
A cantonal network 
consisting of four 
regional associations 
covering the whole 
canton and all of its 
municipalities 
S
iz
e
 
23 Participants 11 Participants 16 Participants 13 Participants 50 Participants 22 Participants 
 Spitex G Spitex H Spitex I Spitex J Spitex K Spitex L 
Type Regional network Regional network Regional network Cantonal network Cantonal network Regional network 
P
u
b
lic
 
F
u
n
d
in
g
 
44.3% 
Municipalities
11.1% Canton 
44.3% Municipalities
11.1% Canton 
20.9% 
Municipalities 
35.1% Canton 
57.9% Municipalities 
31.2% 
Municipalities 
40.8% Municipalities 
11.8% Canton 
S
tr
u
c
tu
re
 A regional network 
operating on behalf 
of multiple 
municipalities within 
their boundaries 
A regional network 
operating on behalf 
of multiple 
municipalities within 
their boundaries 
A regional network 
operating on behalf 
of the canton within 
the boundaries of 
several 
municipalities 
A cantonal network 
covering the whole 
canton and all of its 
municipalities 
A cantonal network 
covering the whole 
canton and all of its 
municipalities 
A regional network 
operating on behalf 
of multiple 
municipalities within 
their boundaries 
S
iz
e
 
50 Participants 70 Participants 36 Participants 44 Participants 10 Participants 9 Participants 
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The exact selection of cases was based on a two-step procedure and informed by knowledge gained 
throughout the research process. The first step involved a comparative summary of contextual and 
structural network aspects covering all cantons in Switzerland. In the next step, the results of the 
comparative summary were examined and the cases with sufficient variation in their contextual and 
structural conditions were selected. In keeping with the QCA requirements (Ragin 1987; Rihoux and 
Ragin 2009), we chose a number of cases, which was small enough to allow us to gain familiarity with 
the specific contextual, structural, functioning and managerial characteristics of each network, but large 
enough to provide sufficient variation among cases. 
 
Operationalization 
At the end of the literature review, we identified four determinants of network performance 
(resource munificence, centrally governed network structures, formalized coordination mechanisms and 
network management) as key conjunctural conditions. In order to perform an fsQCA and investigate 
their joint dimensions, extracted conditions needed to be operationalized and calibrated on the basis of 
theoretical and substantive knowledge gained throughout the research process. The following table 
summarizes the definitions, the operationalization and the calibration of the conditions (Table 2). It 
presents the exact definition and measurement for every condition. The definitions and 
operationalization were directly derived from the existing literature. The criteria for the calibration of the 
conditions were drawn from studies, including significant ones like Provan and Milward (1995), Provan 
and Sebastian (1998), Provan and Kenis (2008) and Herranz (2010), or derived from substantive 
knowledge gained through the research process. Due to the qualitative nature of our data, in the 
following section we will provide the rationale for the exact assignment of varying membership scores 
ranging from 0 (full non-membership) to 1 (full membership) in the following part. 
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Table 2. Operationalization and Calibration of Conditions 
Condition Definition Measure/Items Calibration 
Resource 
Munificence 
Availability of financial 
resources in the 
network environment 
(Provan/Milward 1995) 
% Public funding 
1 – full membership: highest % of public funding in CH (69.5%) 
0.5 – crossover point: Swiss average for public funding (48.8%) 
0 – full non-membership: lowest % of public funding in CH 
(26.2%) 
Centrally 
Governed 
Network 
Structures 
Shared or centralized 
network governance 
with or without distinct 
administrative entities 
(Provan/Kenis 2008) 
The existence of a system of multiple participants that govern the network together (shared 
governance), or the existence of a central core agency which governs the network and at the same 
time engages in the provision of services (Lead Organization) or the existence of a central core 
agency simply providing administration (NAO) 
1 – full membership: network is governed by a NAO 
0.67 – network is governed by a Lead Organization 
0.33 – multiple members engage in governing the network 
(shared governance) 
0 – full non-membership: no distinct governance structures 
Formalized 
Coordination 
Mechanisms 
Reliance on 
formalized 
relationships, 
contractual 
agreements, well-
organized network 
meetings and 
formalized procedures 
Questionnaire items (2013 Spitex network survey) (1 – disagree / 7 – agree) 
 
1. Regular meetings are normally organized to coordinate the activities of partner organizations; 
2. My Spitex participates on regular meetings with the partner organizations to coordinate the 
homecare provision; 
3. The coordination of each other’s activities in the collaboration involving my Spitex and the 
partner organizations is based on standard operating procedures (like rules, policies, forms); 
 
Items of questionnaire (2013 Spitex network survey) (1 - informal / 7 formalized) 
4. My Spitex relies on agreements that spell out relationships between partners. These 
agreements are… 
5. My Spitex relies on communication channels when contacting partner organizations about 
issues related to the homecare. These are… 
6. To coordinate each other’s activities in the collaboration my Spitex and its partner relies on 
agreements. These agreements are… 
1 – full membership: full reliance on all of the mechanisms 
mentioned  
0.67 – prevalence of and reliance on most of the features 
mentioned 
0.33 – existence of some of the features mentioned, but no 
reliance on formalized coordination mechanisms 
0 – full non-membership: no existence of formal agreements 
between partners, defined procedures, regular network 
meetings, or formalized coordination mechanisms 
Network 
Management 
Distinct actor or set of 
actors actively 
(1) facilitating 
interaction between 
partner organizations; 
and/or 
(2) easing tensions 
and unifying interests 
between network 
members; 
and/or 
(3) developing visions, 
activating network 
partners & promoting 
identification 
(Agranoff/McGuire 
2003) 
Questionnaire items (2013 Spitex network survey) (Nobody, Institutional Bodies, Spitex) 
Who performs following activities? 
1. Defining the operating rules to favor the partner collaboration; 
2. Defining the framework of rules within which the partner collaboration can take place; 
3. Facilitating the interaction among the organizations that collaborate for the homecare 
provision; 
4. Helping the partner organizations to collaborate regardless their contrasting interests 
5. Solving conflicts among the partner organizations when they occur; 
6. Acting as a mediator and broker (of interests/points of view) among the partner 
organizations; 
7.  Identifying the partner organizations and lead them to participate in the collaboration; 
8. Forging an agreement among the partner organizations on the role and support of the 
network activities; 
9. Forging an agreement among the partner organizations on the mission and vision of the 
network; 
10. Lead all the partner organizations towards a common objective 
1 – full membership: clear actor(s) engaged in facilitating, 
mediating and leading 
0.67 – clear actor(s) engaged in either facilitating and mediating 
or facilitating and leading or mediating and leading 
0.33 – clear actor(s) engaged in facilitating interaction or 
mediating or leading 
0 – full non-membership: no clear network management 
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As far as resource munificence is concerned, we took the availability of public funding as a 
measure: greater percentages of public funding mean greater availability of financial resources in the 
external environment that are certain and not reliant on collected fees or donations. Following the lead of 
Kitchener et al. (2002), we took the highest funding in Switzerland (69.5%) as a threshold for full-
membership (fs score 1); the Swiss national average for public funding (48.8%) as a crossover point (fs 
score 0.5); and the lowest public funding for health and social care services in Switzerland (26.2%) as a 
threshold for full non-membership (fs score 0). We then transformed the percentage of public funding 
into the respective membership scores based on the so called “direct method” using estimates of log odds 
as a middle step as proposed by Charles Ragin (2008)4.  
As far as network governance structures are concerned, we followed Provan and Kenis (2008) and 
assigned full membership when the network is centrally governed by a Network Administrative 
Organization (fs score 1); we assigned strong membership (fs score 0.67) when the network is centrally 
governed by a Lead Organization5; weak membership (fs score 0.33) when network governance is shared 
among participants; and full non-membership when there is no distinct network governance structure (fs 
score 0).  
As far as formalized coordination mechanisms are concerned, we relied on the definitions provided 
by Brown et al. (1998) and Jennings and Ewalt (1998) and assigned full non-membership when there is 
no existence of formal agreements for defined procedures, regulated decision-making processes, regular 
network meetings, and other formalized coordination mechanisms, such as written agendas or formalized 
communication channels (fs score 0). We assigned weak membership when such features exist on paper, 
but the reliance on formalized coordination mechanisms for network interaction and governance is weak 
                                                          
4 For the exact approach used please consult Ragin (2008). 
5 We distinguished between two sorts of central core agencies and calibrated varying membership scores for NAO and Lead 
Organization - networks While a Network Administrative Organization is established in a top-down manner to manage and 
control the whole network of organizations, a Lead Organization emerges through time on without necessarily being linked 
to all or most of the other network partners. Therefore, the degree centrality is likely to be higher for networks managed by 
a NAO. 
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(fs score 0.33). We assigned strong membership when we identified a prevalence of and reliance on most 
of the features mentioned within a network (fs score 0.67), and finally, we assigned full membership 
when network interaction and governance relies strongly on mechanisms like formalized network rules, 
contractual agreements, well-organized network meetings and a regulated decision-making process (fs 
score 1).  
As far as network management is concerned, we based our calibration on a typology of network 
management activities derived from Kort and Klijn (2011) and Agranoff and McGuire (2001; 2003): 
facilitating (promoting interaction between partner organizations), mediating (relieving tensions and 
unifying interests between network members) and leading (developing visions, activating network 
partners and promoting identification). We assigned full non-membership if we could not identify any 
distinct network management activity (fs score 0); we assigned weak membership if we identified at 
least one of mentioned management activities (facilitating or mediating or leading) (fs score 0.33); we 
assigned strong membership if we identified at least two of the three managerial actions (fs score 0.67); 
and finally we assigned full membership if we identified all three of the activities at the same time (fs 
score 1). 
In order to assess the extent of membership in each condition, we triangulated the data collected 
through the questionnaire (see the items in the Appendix) with in-depth case knowledge that we gained 
through the interviews. See the “Data Collection” section below for more information. 
 
Network Performance. Measuring network performance is a difficult task. Since the seminal work of 
Provan and Milward in 1995, tens of studies have been published about the concept and measures of 
network performance but a general consensus has not been reached. Some scholars have focused on 
network performance from an organizational perspective (Provan et al. 2005; O’Toole and Meier 2004, 
2006; Kiefer and Montjoy 2006; Goerdel 2006; May and Wintera 2007; Meier and O’Toole 2003, 2010; 
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LeRoux et al. 2009; Akkerman and Torenvlied 2011), others have considered the entire network 
(Mandell 1994; Provan and Milward 1995; Provan and Sebastian 1998; Keast et al. 2004; Van Raaij 
2006; Lindencrona et al. 2009; Provan et al. 2009; Herranz 2010), while others still have evaluated 
network performance by considering the effect on the community (Provan and Milward 1995; Provan 
and Sebastian 1998; Herranz 2010). Building on various levels of analysis (in organizational, network 
and community terms), the measures used in the field have also diverged. Some scholars have used 
structural measures to evaluate performance (Provan et al. 2005), some have utilized procedural 
measures (Mandell 1994; Keast et al. 2004; Van Raaij 2006), and others have focused on output and 
outcome measures (Provan and Milward 1995; Provan and Sebastian 1998; Meier and O’Toole 2003, 
2010; O’Toole and Meier 2004, 2006). As Raab et al. (2013: 6) pointed out, on the basis of Kenis and 
Provan (2009) and Simon (1947), “this does not come as a surprise”, as networks are multidimensional 
and assessment criteria are inherently normative. We are aware of this, and we acknowledge also the 
importance of public networks for policy making and implementation, so we believe that it is important 
to try to evaluate network performance and look for its determinants. Therefore, in accordance with the 
scope of our paper, we will follow Kenis and Provan (2009) by focusing on the performance of the 
network as a whole and evaluate it in terms of “network capacity to achieve stated goals” (Kenis and 
Provan 2009; Turrini et al. 2010; Raab et al. 2013). 
More specifically, since Spitex networks are mandated, clear objectives can be found in their 
designated public assignments and established performance agreements. These documents state that 
patients should be treated as long as medically possible in their own household environment (Spitex 
Association 2011) and that according to the logic of a one-stop shop a comprehensive range of services 
should be offered. However, performance agreements between the canton and each Spitex clearly state 
the containment of costs as an important goal, as the networks receive up to 69% of their budget through 
public funding. Hence, in order to have a measure of network performance that reflect the Spitex 
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networks’ goals, we considered the ability of Spitex networks to serve as many patients as possible (1), 
with as many services as possible (2) and at the lowest possible cost to the community (3), and then 
combined them into a single measure. The ability to serve patients was measured by the percentage of 
patients served: the more patients are served, the fewer people are treated in nursing homes, hospitals, or 
other stationary facilities. This is something that is directly related to the guiding principles mentioned 
above. In particular, we considered the ratio between the number of patients over 64 treated by the 
Spitex network and the total number of people over 64 living in the respective Spitex catchment area. 
We considered patients over 64 as they normally constitute up to 85% of the patients treated by Spitex 
networks. Furthermore, we believe that controlling for the elderly population in each network 
environment allows us to control the varying local demands. 
The ability to provide as many services as possible was measured using the figures for the number 
of services provided to us by the survey participants. The larger the number of services that are offered 
directly by the network, the smaller the number of clients will be that need to take initiative and find 
alternatives to meet their needs. The cost of network activities to the community was evaluated using the 
ratio between overall costs and hours delivered6. This makes it possible to account for the financial 
aspects of service delivery, as Spitex network activity is mainly funded by public money. 
Finally, a unitary measure of network performance was created. In particular, after the calibration of 
each performance indicator using the “direct method” as we detailed above, the membership scores were 
added up and an overall network performance measure was created by calibrating new membership 
scores for network performance based on the totals of the single indicators. The calibration of 
membership scores was based on substantive grounds. After plotting the percentage of patients served, 
the number of services provided and the cost to the community of each case, we used the Tosmana 
                                                          
6 In order to check for variation due to clients’ needs, we chose a measure that weights the cost relative to the hours 
delivered. 
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Software tool to calibrate thresholds that split the cases into clusters7. Table 3 summarizes the calibration 
of each indicator and the overall network performance assessment, while Table 4 summarizes the 
performance of all cases. 
 
  Table 3. Network Performance Calibration 
Indicator Full membership - 1 Crossover point – 0.5 Full non-membership – 0 
% Patients served 15% 10% 8.50% 
#Services 20 Services 17 Services 12 Services 
Cost/H 92 CHF/H CH average – 105.99 154 CHF/H 
Overall ∑ membership score > 
2.19 (best performer) 
∑ membership score = 
1.5 (3 x 0.5) 
∑ membership score < 0.16 
(worst performer) 
 
 
  Table 4. Network Performance 
Case % patients 
served 
# 
Services 
Costs/
H 
% patients 
served 
# 
Services 
Costs/H ∑ Overall 
Spitex A 7.50% 14 83.71 0.01 0.14 0.99 1.14 0.31 
Spitex B 9.82% 15 101.71 0.41 0.23 0.57 1.21 0.34 
Spitex C 9.79% 15 100.49 0.40 0.23 0.76 1.39 0.44 
Spitex D 12.65% 19 106.38 0.83 0.88 0.49 2.21 0.95 
Spitex E 19.77% 21 167.70 1.00 0.98 0.02 2.00 0.89 
Spitex F 16.82% 21 139.87 0.98 0.98 0.11 2.07 0.92 
Spitex G 9.48% 19 79.19 0.26 0.88 1.00 2.14 0.94 
Spitex H 9.46% 19 71.08 0.25 0.88 1.00 2.13 0.94 
Spitex I 12.61% 19 117.07 0.80 0.88 0.33 2.02 0.90 
Spitex J 7.34% 10 134.33 0.00 0.01 0.15 0.17 0.05 
Spitex K 9.08% 15 101.04 0.14 0.23 0.74 1.11 0.29 
Spitex L 9.78% 16 121.73 0.47 0.35 0.27 1.09 0.29 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 We worked with several different thresholds during our analyses. All of them produced the same results after applying 
Boolean minimization. We selected the thresholds that split the cases into clusters in the best fashion, in accordance with the 
substantive case knowledge that we gained throughout the research process. In this sense, the calibration of outcome 
conditions that was obtained proved to be the best match for the empirical evidence. 
53 
 
Data Collection 
The data collection for the selected conditions (resource munificence, centrally governed network 
structure, formalized coordination mechanisms and network management) was based on a three-step 
procedure. The first step was a national survey that was distributed to the directors of all focal Spitex 
organizations operating in Switzerland. 523 directors were contacted, with a response rate of about 50 %. 
The Appendix shows the questionnaire items that were used to collect data about each condition and the 
corresponding Cronbach’s alpha. The second step was about getting an insight into each case by 
analyzing information provided by network members on their websites, annual reports and official 
information on government sites of every level. The last step of the procedure involved semi-structured 
interviews with the directors, other executives of each Spitex organization and the heads of public and 
private organizations in the networks. The interviews were based on the case knowledge that had already 
been acquired in the first two steps. In these interviews, specific case-related questions were asked in 
order to gain in-depth knowledge about every single network and the respective cases and conditions. 
The interviews were conducted either directly on site or over the telephone. They were recorded and 
transcribed no more than 24 hours after the dialogue. In total, 51 interviews were conducted for the 12 
cases. During our analysis, we triangulated our collected data extensively to match assigned membership 
scores with empirical evidence. 
The data regarding the outcome variables stem from the annual reports of each Spitex organization 
for the year 2010 and the returned surveys, while the data regarding the population in 2010 within each 
community were gathered using the details of the residential population in Swiss municipalities provided 
by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. 
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Findings 
After complementing the conditions with the outcome variables in the calibrated data table (Table 
5), we used the fsQCA software to obtain a “Truth Table” (Table 6), which helps to identify sets of 
conditions, in other words, multiple causal paths to an outcome using a present/absent dichotomy. 
   
  Table 5. Calibrated Data Table 
 
Case Resource 
Munificence 
Centrally Governed Network 
Structures 
Formalized Coordination 
Mechanisms 
Network 
Management 
Overall Network 
Performance 
Spitex A 0.36 0.33 0.33 0 0.31 
Spitex B 0.37 1 1 0 0.34 
Spitex C 0.08 0.33 1 0 0.44 
Spitex D 0.59 0.33 0.67 0 0.95 
Spitex E 0.67 1 1 0.67 0.89 
Spitex F 0.95 1 0.67 0.67 0.92 
Spitex G 0.72 0.67 0.33 1 0.94 
Spitex H 0.72 0.33 1 0 0.94 
Spitex I 0.74 0.67 0.67 1 0.90 
Spitex J 0.79 0 0.33 0.67 0.05 
Spitex K 0.09 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.29 
Spitex L 0.63 0 0.33 0 0.29 
 
  Table 6. Truth Table with Logical Remainder 
Case Resource 
Munificence 
Centrally 
Governed Network 
Structures 
Formalized 
Coordination 
Mechanisms 
Network 
Management 
Network Performance 
(consistency threshold 0.75 
PRI) 
Network Performance 
Consistency PRI 
F; I; E 1 1 1 1 1 1 
D; H 1 0 1 0 1 .771812 
G 1 1 0 1 1 1 
C; K 0 0 1 0 0 .411347 
A 0 0 0 0 0 .314607 
B 0 1 1 0 0 .672897 
L 1 0 0 0 0 .294737 
J 1 0 0 1 0 .446429 
0 0 0 0 1 R  
0 0 0 1 1 R  
0 0 1 0 0 R  
0 0 1 0 1 R  
0 0 1 1 1 R  
0 1 0 1 1 R  
0 1 1 0 0 R  
0 1 1 1 0 R  
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In Table 6, the twelve cases are represented by eight different combinations of conditions and the 
outcome variables. Three configurations, involving six cases, display a consistent combination of given 
conditions and high performance, while five configurations display an inconsistent combination of given 
conditions and low network performance. The consistency threshold was set at 0.75 (PRI), in accordance 
with Rihoux and Ragin (2009). Configurations displaying higher consistency were coded 1, indicating a 
consistent combination of indicated conditions and a present outcome (high performance), while 
configurations displaying lower consistency were coded 0, signaling an inconsistent combination and 
therefore an absent outcome (low performance). Logical remainders, configurations which are 
theoretically possible, but which were not observed among the cases, were coded with R. By looking at 
the Truth Table above, the reader is already enabled to get an idea of the different paths leading to high 
network performance, but the configurations of conditions leading to high network performance will 
become more perceptible after performing the so-called Boolean minimization and the extraction of the 
“minimal formula”. Through a series of paired comparisons between configurations that only differ in 
one respect – in the presence/absence of one condition, while all of the others are identical – we can 
derive a simpler equation or minimal formula for the conditions leading to high network performance 
(Table 7). 
 
  Table 7. Results 
 Raw coverage Unique coverage Consistency 
R*G*M 0.381543 0.369146 1.000000 
R*g*F*m 0.286501 0.274105 0.859504 
Frequency cut-off: 1.000000 Consistency cut-off: 0.859504 Logical Remainder: absent – Complex Solution 
Solution coverage: 0.655647; Solution consistency: 0.933333 
Cases with above 0.5 membership in terms R*g*F*m: D, H. Cases with above 0.5 membership in terms R*G*M: E, F, G, I 
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The consistency and coverage scores from our analysis revealed consistent approximations of subset 
relations and broad empirical relevance of found subsets. Conditions written in capitals indicate the 
presence of a condition, while conditions written in lower case indicate the absence of a condition. The 
multiplication symbol serves as the logical operator “AND” and the plus sign serves as the logical 
operator “OR”. Based on the Boolean minimization, we derived two more parsimonious solutions for 
high network performance that can be expressed in the following way: 
 
RESOURCE MUNIFICENCE (R) * CENTRALLY GOVERNED NETWORK STRUCTURE (G) * 
NETWORK MANAGEMENT (M) + RESOURCE MUNIFICENCE (R) * centrally governed network 
structures (g) * FORMALIZED COORDINATION MECHANISMS (F) * network management (m) => 
HIGH NETWORK PERFORMANCE 
 
These combinations can be reformulated as follows: 
(1) In a resource-munificent context, the presence of centrally governed network structures 
combined with the presence of network management leads to high network performance. 
(2) In a resource-munificent context, the absence of centrally governed network structures 
combined with formalized coordination mechanisms and the absence of distinct network 
management also leads to high network performance. 
 
In order to complete the Qualitative Comparative Analysis, it is necessary to analyse the causal 
relationships of conditions with each other and to engage in an analysis of necessity. After studying the 
set-theoretic relation between membership in the outcome and membership in possible necessary 
conditions, as proposed by Ragin (2000), we could not identify a single condition that would meet the 
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consistency threshold8 of .9. However, considering the two extracted paths and the analysis of necessity 
together, we can interpreted resource munificence as INUS conditions. INUS means that the condition is 
an insufficient but necessary part of causal paths, which are themselves unnecessary but sufficient9. On 
the other hand, network governance structures, formalized coordination mechanisms and network 
management are neither necessary, nor sufficient conditions for the occurrence of the outcome. 
However, considering the extracted configurations, we can nonetheless state that centralized network 
governance structures/network management and decentralized governance structures/high reliance on 
formalized coordination mechanisms/absence of distinct network management can be considered 
sufficient combinations of conditions to achieve high performance in resource-munificent environments. 
 
Discussion 
After extracting two paths towards high network performance, it is necessary to discuss these paths 
and enrich the analysis in a qualitative manner. Therefore, we will use case evidence to reinforce the 
extracted solutions. 
Resource munificence is a given in all successful cases. As well as confirming Provan and 
Milward’s results from 1995, this is in keeping with the ideas developed by the researchers during the 
research process. Several interviewees stated that without sufficient resources, their effectiveness might 
be jeopardized. “The (public) funding of services is always an issue. There is no question that the 
services delivered – which are deemed necessary and appreciated by the public – are cost intensive. 
Therefore, in order to provide these services in an adequate manner, we need suitable cantonal and 
municipal funding” (CEOi). 
                                                          
8 Results of the analysis of necessity: resource munificence – consistency 0.760331; coverage 0.822653; network 
governance structures – consistency 0.699725; coverage 0.848080; formalization – consistency 0.811295; coverage 
0.736250; network management – consistency 0.484848; coverage 0.811060. 
9 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing us to this interpretation. 
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Given “adequate” resources, we can identify two different configurations of conditions that lead to 
high network performance. Since the network governance system is based on legal frameworks and 
regional traditions of public service provision, the structure of these arrangements is seen as a given. 
Each canton passed legislation that set the pattern for the mode of service delivery. The way networks 
are organized and participant interaction is structured seems to be contingent on the network governance 
structure in place. In this sense, the use of formalized coordination mechanisms or the active practice of 
network management (i.e. facilitating, mediating and/or leading) depends on the extent to which a 
network governance system is structured around the networks’ participants. 
In decentralized networks (in our analysis D and H), participants organize their collaboration jointly, 
in a horizontal way. Both networks rely on a governance that is shared among participants (centrally-
governed network structures: 0.33). In the Spitex D network participants are mostly non-profit 
organizations often with an own agenda, seeking to increase their own legitimacy as independent 
agencies. Notable hierarchies do not exist and neither do clear actors within the networks that could take 
the initiative on their own (network management: 0), as each participants seeks to take a part in the 
governance of the network. Hence, the power and control structure of the network (Provan and Milward 
1995) is complex. It is being equally shared among multiple more or less scattered actors in the network. 
However, at the same time, there is a need of organizing the participants’ efforts towards a common and 
guarantee a certain level of cohesion, as CEOd pointed out: “With some matters, it can be very difficult 
to find a consensual solution. Nevertheless, since we are all part of the network, we have to make sure 
there is uniformity and equal treatment of clients in the whole area”. In order to guarantee a common 
ground and common standards in certain critical aspects, Spitex D relies on formalized procedures, 
network rules and contractual agreements between the most important network nodes. Formal contracts 
exist between the municipality and the participating organizations, as well as between the participants, 
i.e. the focal Spitex organizations and the organizations providing complementary services. Moreover, 
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the city and the two most important organizations govern the network using regular network meetings 
(six to seven a year), joint decision-making and contracts defining common strategic and operative 
activities, and the contribution of every participant in the governing subgroup. Furthermore, the use of 
formalized coordination mechanisms serves to create “equal status, fairness, openness and transparency 
among the organizations involved”, in a “key strategy for successful collaboration” (CEOd). “We do 
not want to enforce our views on anybody: the collaboration has to be right for everyone. It needs to be 
a win-win situation. Transparency and fairness are always very important for our collaboration, and 
obviously, reliability is as well. Beyond that, we also ensure that all participating organizations have an 
equal status” (CEOd). Hence, formalized coordination mechanisms serve as means to define 
relationships, roles and responsibilities, and to establish a balance of power among the most important 
participants. 
This notion was also supported by interviewees from Spitex H. Spitex H is the biggest network in 
the analysis with about 70 participants. It is delivering services to 48 municipalities. Despite its size, 
Spitex H represent a form of shared-governance network, as it is governed by two subgroups comprising 
most of the 70 network participants as well as representatives of the 48 municipalities. Due to that, the 
network has a fragmented and horizontal structure10. The power and control structure is very complex 
due to the networks’ numerous participants with a stake taking an active part in the governance of the 
network. Similarly to Spitex D, each subgroup is in an ongoing struggle to maintain a balance of power 
among these two subgroups using formalized coordination mechanisms to define relationships, roles and 
responsibilities. “Decisions are always made as required by the law and established in the statute” 
(CEOh). As a consequence these two subgroup representing a big majority of network participants are 
                                                          
10 There are indications that Spitex H might be a mixed-type, where a subset of network participants jointly form a center of 
the network. We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing us to this interpretation. The issue of mixed-types 
between various forms of network governance structures is an interesting one. Unfortunately, within the framework of this 
study it is not feasible to enter an in-depth discussion of mixed-types but this issue can represent a rich ground for future 
investigation and research. 
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mutually defining the strategy of the network and the operative activities and planned meetings are seen 
as the best solution for mutual decision making by “clarifying situations or sharing a strategy” (CEOh). 
In this sense, interviews from both above mentioned networks revealed that in shared-governance 
networks, equal status, transparency, reliability and fairness among major network participants are key 
factors for uniform, coherent action and ultimately for successful service delivery. In situations where 
network governance is complex due to fragmentation and decentralization, formalized coordination 
mechanisms serve as a means to organize, coordinate and direct participants’ efforts towards a common 
goal. In the analyzed shared-governance networks several participants formed a group of “network 
administrators” (Cristofoli et al. 2014b) that established and maintained well-defined and formalized 
coordination mechanisms as a basis for a procedural decision-making process, in order to ensure 
coherence throughout the entire network and effective service provisioning. 
Meanwhile, networks that are governed more centrally do not need to rely on formalized 
coordination mechanisms as a way to ensure collaborative action towards a common goal. This does not 
mean that they do not have these mechanisms at all, but they rely on them to a lesser extent11. Instead of 
relying exclusively on formalized coordination mechanisms to organize participants’ efforts, these 
networks (in our analysis E, F, G and I) actively exert influence through the network management to 
create an appropriate basis for organizing and coordinating the efforts of network participants towards a 
common goal. Network management, which can either be exercised by one person or by a group of 
people, covers everything from facilitating the interaction of different network members across all levels, 
mediating tensions and reconnecting various issues, to developing visions and activating network 
partners. “Spitex F is the key player, managing relations with the Cantonal Government and 
coordinating the activities of other organizations” (MANAGEMENTf). The centralization of power and 
responsibility around one central core agency provides autonomy and enables the agency to steer the 
                                                          
11 Membership scores for formalized coordination mechanisms are varying between 0.33 and 1. 
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network in a managerial way. “He [the CEO] participates in all strategic decision-making processes that 
involve the various members at all levels and in different commissions (…) He is always present” 
(MANAGEMENTe). These central core agencies usually have sufficient resources and above all a 
certain legitimacy to play a leading role, organize collaborative efforts and move the network towards 
the achievement of network goals. Consequently, they can intervene to solve problems even if it means 
activating human and economic resources outside the formal channels. “It is thanks to the director that 
we have a flexible and dynamic organization” (MANAGEMENTg). 
Interestingly, while the second extracted path includes only shared-governance networks (Spitex D 
and H), the first path includes both, networks that are governed by a Network Administrative 
Organization (Spitex E and F) and networks that are managed by a Lead Organization (Spitex G and I). 
By comparing the characteristics of these four centrally governed networks with the assistance of Table 
5, it becomes evident that the four networks differ in the way they rely on network management. While 
in networks managed by a Lead Organization, there is a network management engaging in facilitating 
interaction between partner organizations, relieving tensions, unifying interests between network 
members and developing visions, activating network partners as well as promoting identification, NAO 
governed networks tend not to engage in leading the network. The explanation is straightforward. The 
difference lies in the networks’ inception. Network Administrative Organizations are put into the most 
central position by cantonal and municipal legal frameworks as a separate administrative entity and are 
therefore equipped with enhanced legitimacy among network participants in order to specifically 
coordinate and sustain the network (Provan and Kenis 2008). Their founding idea is based on defining 
the framework of rules within which the partner collaboration can take place, facilitating the interaction 
among the organizations that collaborate and on acting as a mediator and broker among the partner 
organizations, rather than on leading all partner organizations towards the fulfilment of common goals. 
On the other hand, central core agencies in Lead Organization Networks often emerged as the most 
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central node in the network through being the core provider agency. They assume a leading role as they 
are in a central position in the flow of clients and resources (Provan and Kenis 2008). “I am responsible 
for the operative accomplishment of the public assignment, and therefore I also have a strategic leading 
role among the other partner organizations. We cannot leave everything that we see as strategic to the 
others. There are a lot of operations that we guide, from the definition of services to the structuration 
and organization of collaboration. We prepare these things and forward them for approval” (CEOi)12. 
The key insight gained during the research process is that the organizing principles for participant 
interaction, whether they involve formalized coordination mechanisms or network management, are 
contingent on the network governance structure in place. We can identify two broader principles: 
bureaucratic organization and coordination of network participants on the one hand, and a rather 
managerial approach on the other. Networks integrated by a central core agency tend to rely less on 
formalized mechanisms and allow the top management to steer and nurture the network with their 
managerial abilities. Shared-governance networks tend to be more complex, with various powerful 
network participants usually sharing the task of governing the network by taking a bureaucratic approach 
in order to organize, coordinate and direct network participants towards a common goal in accordance 
with established rules and procedures. The scope for managerial intervention is thus reduced to a 
minimum, while the reliance on formalized coordination mechanisms becomes a governing principle. 
 
Conclusion 
This study provides insights into the joint dimensions and the conjunctural effects of four 
determinants of network performance. It reveals two paths towards high network performance, which 
differ in the way that networks are structured, how they rely on formalized coordination mechanisms and 
                                                          
12 It would be interesting distinguishing centrally-governed networks into networks governed by a Lead Organization and a 
NAO, and exploring which combination of factors can lead to the network success in both cases. A multi value QCA and 
more cases would be necessary. 
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the importance given to network management. In a resource-munificent context, network performance 
seems to depend on different combinations of network structures, formalized coordination mechanisms 
and network management. When the network is governed by a central core agency, network 
performance seems to depend on the simultaneous presence of network management. When the 
governance of the network is shared among the participants, network success seems to be related to the 
simultaneous presence of formalized coordination mechanisms defining partner interaction. 
This leads to significant implications and conclusions about how to make public networks really 
work (recalling Provan and Milward 2001) that confirm and complement previous studies. First of all, 
our results partly confirm what Provan and Milward showed in 1995: network context, or rather resource 
munificence, is a necessary but not sufficient part of causal paths leading to network success that are 
themselves not necessary but sufficient. Secondly, our results show that specific structural, functioning 
and managerial determinants of network performance (i.e. network governance structures, formalized 
coordination mechanisms and network management) are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for 
the success of a network. Only a meaningful combination of them can lead to high network performance. 
Thirdly, and consequently, our results confirm what Turrini et al. (2010) invited researchers to explore: 
there are joint dimension among determinants of network performance. We have found two equifinal 
paths towards network success: 
 
(1) In resource-munificent contexts, the combination between the presence of centralized network 
governance and network management, or (2) decentralized network governance and formalized 
coordination mechanisms defining the ground for partner interaction, seems to lead to network success.  
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Thus, following propositions can thus be formulated: 
 
Proposition 1. In resource-munificent contexts, the combination between centrally governed 
network structures and network management leads to network success. 
Proposition 2. In resource-munificent contexts, the combination between shared network 
governance and formalized coordination mechanisms leads to network success. 
 
Fourthly, our results shed additional light on the fact that there is more than one optimum way of 
achieving high performance in public networks. Whether it is best to apply bureaucratic or managerial 
tools is contingent upon the network structure in place. This has significant implications for those 
managing and governing a network. In particular, when the network structure is complex and the 
governance is shared among multiple centers of power, impartial administration of the network by 
establishing and maintaining formalized coordination mechanisms seems to be an appropriate way of 
securing effective collaboration within a network setting. In contrast, when the governance structure is 
centralized, there is more leeway to actively exercise influence through network management. Thus, our 
results are in line with the findings of Provan and Milward (1995), as centralized integration through a 
central core agency within a network enhances network performance significantly. They are also in 
keeping with the results of Provan and Sebastian (1998), who showed that if a network is not centrally 
integrated as proposed by Provan and Milward (1995), high network performance is still possible, if 
networks with widely scattered members are strongly integrated by overlapping subgroups (and probably 
formalized joint procedures and rules, as our results seem to suggest). In this respect, our results seem to 
be partially different from the Raab et al. (2013) results indicating that centralized integration trough a 
core agency is a necessary but insufficient condition for effective public networks. However, combining 
our results with the results obtained by Provan and Milward (1995), Provan and Sebastian (1998), Raab 
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et al. 2013 and the theoretical reasoning of Provan and Kenis (2008), Kenis and Provan (2009) 
respectively, it might be argued that centralized integration through a core agency is a necessary but 
insufficient part of a causal path leading to effective public networks that is itself unnecessary but 
sufficient. Yet, more research is needed in order to provide a clear answer to this hypothesis. 
Finally, our analysis is the first study that challenges the assumption of Provan and Kenis (2008) 
that shared-governance network are most effective in situations with few participants that are informally 
organized. While that assumption still might be valid, we have found evidence that successful shared 
governance networks might as well (a) consist out of relatively many network participants (Spitex H) 
and (b) rely on bureaucratic means to organize and coordinate the efforts of participants towards a 
common goal. What is crucial for network success rather than the network’s size, is that the complexity 
of power relations among network participants is addressed adequately. In highly complex governance 
structures involving multiple centers of power (Spitex D and H), bureaucratic means fulfil their typical 
functions of ensuring coherence, reliability, transparency and uniformity by defining relationships, roles 
and responsibilities of otherwise scattered and fragmented network participants. Hence, we believe that it 
is crucial to interpret a network governance structure in front of its specific history and the prevailing 
power relations among the participants in order to understand the underlying social processes within 
public networks. 
Although we believe that our configurational approach and results provide a better understanding of 
the joint dimensions among key determinants of public network performance and show various paths 
towards high network performance, it is also clear that our research has its limitations and requires 
further elaboration. One limitation is related to the resource munificence measure. Due to the lack of 
available data, we were not able to measure resource munificence by including all financial resources, 
the presence of technical support agencies, or the support from the broader community. We 
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operationalized resource munificence as the availability of public funding in the network environment, 
thus focusing above all on the stability of public finance. 
Another limitation is the rather low number of conditions. In order to conduct a Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis, it was necessary to focus the analysis on a small number of core conditions, since 
the amount of possible configurations increases exponentially with the number of conditions. Especially 
when the number of cases is at the lower end of the possible spectrum, it is necessary to limit the number 
of conditions. Therefore, other predictors mentioned by the literature were not integrated in the model. 
We believe that this fact also contributes to the overall solution coverage of 66 percent. The solution 
coverage is comparable to the R² used in statistical analyses. With this coverage rate we can account for 
2/3 of the cases we analyzed. Adding other determinants of public network performance might have 
enhanced the analysis and obtained results. Consequently, we can conclude that there are likely other 
configurational paths that lead to high network performance. Investigating more comprehensively the 
effects among various predictors mentioned in the literature was not feasible in such a study, but it will 
be the focus of our future research. We are convinced that these paths can be a fruitful basis for future 
and more complex investigation into the determinants of public network performance. 
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Abstract 
How to make public networks really work? Many scholars have recently answered this question by 
emphasizing the importance of network management over other aspects, while few have stressed the 
trust between network members or the effects of an appropriate structure. Yet, studies that investigate the 
interactive effects of varying determinants on network performance are almost non-existent. Unsatisfied 
with the level of integration within the literature, this paper develops and tests the idea of logically 
coherent organizing principles by building on studies emphasizing the importance of distinct and partly 
competing factors, such as network management, formalization, network structure and trust, for public 
network performance. Based on Exploratory Factor Analysis and OLS Regression on 265 surveys that 
have been completed by members of the 523 health and social care networks in Switzerland, the 
obtained results confirm what has been hypothesized based on the previously conducted studies: there 
are multiple, logically coherent organizing principles within successful inter-organizational service 
delivery networks. However, only a meaningful combination of structure and practices has positive 
effects on public network performance.  
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Introduction 
The discourse on the abilities of a new type of bureaucrat, the public manager, roots back to the rise 
of the New Public Management paradigm in the late 1980's and 1990's. Following a notion of almighty 
public managers, enthusiasts have often called for more discretionary powers to be given to top-level 
bureaucrats. Christopher Pollitt re-framed that claim as following: a " [...] seldom tested assumption that 
better management will prove an effective solvent for a wide range of economic and social ills" (Pollitt 
1990: 1). The idea that effective management can make a difference has spread also into the literature on 
public networks. Many scholars, especially within the "European tradition" have emphasized the 
importance of network management over other aspects. Even though the concept of management has 
been developed from a personified network manager to a more functional idea of network management, 
the shared believe among a considerable amount of scholars investigating on public networks is that 
network management, personified or not, is paramount to the success of public networks. In this sense, 
there are several contributions that attribute high importance to the activities of guiding network 
processes, facilitating members' interaction and coordination as well as framing of the institutional 
environment - in general the activities subsumed under the concept of network management (Kickert et 
al. 1997; Koopenjan and Klijn 2004; Meier and O'Toole 2001; Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Sørensen 
and Torfing 2009 among others). Even though some of the contributions mentioned deal with varying 
types of networks, typically governance networks vis-à-vis service delivery networks, a majority of 
scholars researching on public networks seems to agree that good network management is the key to 
success in network settings. We believe that this particular stream of research within the field has done 
great empirical work and advanced the knowledge about the effects and importance of network 
management. However, at the same time we feel some discontent regarding the recent overemphasis of 
effective network management and the neglect of other organizing principles such as trust (Edelenbros 
and Klijn 2007; Klijn et al. 2010b: Nolte and Boenigk 2011; Provan and Kenis 2008), or bureaucratic 
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formalization (Brown 1998; Jennings and Ewalt 1998), as well as structural characteristics of the 
network itself (Provan and Milward 1995; Provan and Sebastian 1998; Provan and Kenis 2008; Huang 
and Provan 2007), a concept that has been a key characteristic in understanding public networks and 
their performances but that recently has been paid less attention to by the broader community. In this 
respect, this paper proposes an integration of trust, bureaucratic formalization and network management 
as distinct principles governing within a network and its structure into one framework and seeks to 
unwrap the distinct interactive effects among them. 
Following first evidence, this paper aims at investigating how different network structures require 
varying organizing principles in order to set the path for successful public networks. Organizing 
principles are practices that have been developed in order to foster the coordination of participants’ 
interaction. In detail, we hypothesize that the effect of different organizing principles, such as 
formalization, network management or trust, is contingent upon the degree of network centralization. 
While more decentralized networks are in the need of formal coordination mechanisms to direct 
interdependence aspects by facilitating members' interaction and coordination, centrally organized 
networks profit from rather managerial approaches, usually subsumed under the label network 
management, when organizing and coordinating collaborative efforts within network settings. However, 
since public networks consist always of various participants, they also rely on interpersonal relations to 
manage interdependence aspects. Thus, we hypothesize that trust among participants is beneficial for 
network outcomes.  
In order to investigate the stated relationship between network structure and the distinct organizing 
principles, we will analyze service-delivery networks for the provision of health and social care services 
in Switzerland. Those networks involve different public and private actors jointly organizing and 
providing services to the public. These actors are represented by cantonal government, municipalities, a 
focal organization aiming at providing administration, coordination and/or services and a broad array of 
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other non-profit organizations providing complementary services. Data were collected through a survey 
involving the directors of the organization that is delivering the services to the general public. We 
contacted 575 networks, 523 directors initially agreed to participate in our survey and we obtained a 
response rate of about 50%. 
The paper is structured as following: after reviewing the relevant literature on public networks, we 
will derive hypotheses reflecting the state of art in the field and our expectations. After presenting the 
derived hypotheses, the empirical setting, as well as the data collection and analysis will be introduced to 
the reader. Towards the end of this paper, results will be presented and discussed. 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
The success of public network is a long-standing theme in public network literature (e.g. Mandell 
1984; Agranoff 1986; Provan and Milward 1995; Ferlie and Pettigrew 1996; Kickert et. 1997; Provan 
and Sebastian 1998; Mandell 2001; Provan and Milward 2001; Herranz 2009; Kenis and Provan 2009). 
Many studies have focused on understanding which determinants effect public network performance. In 
their increasing efforts, various schools of thought from both sides of the Atlantic have pursued a variety 
of ideas of possible determinants of public network performance. In fact, the list of tested determinants is 
long (for comparison consider Turrini et al. 2010). Hence, instead of engaging in a full scale review of 
determinants of public network performance, we will focus on our research goal, the discovery of 
contingencies between structural characteristics and organizing principles, and review the literature on 
structural, functioning and managerial determinants that are plausible contributors to our theory. 
 
Structural Characteristics. Regarding network structural characteristics, the publication of Provan 
and Milward (1995) along with Provan and Sebastian (1998) set the pathway for considerations 
regarding the structure of public networks. The most important structural characteristics that were put 
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forward in those publications were the arguments of centralization and integration. In a qualitative study 
comparing four mental health networks Provan and Milward demonstrated how centralized networks in 
conjunction with direct and unfragmented control and mediated by resource munificence and system 
stability directly affect network performance. In this way Provan and Milward showed that differences in 
network effectiveness can be explained primarily by aspects of network structure (centralization) and 
secondly by the network context (external control, system stability and resource munificence). In this 
way, Provan and Milward have developed the first theoretical framework for understanding the effects of 
determinants on public network performance. It seems important to note that contrary to the current 
trend within the field, the first influential framework was based on arguments of structural 
characteristics. This framework was successively expanded by Provan and Sebastian in 1998. Based on a 
similar approach to appreciate effects of network structural characteristics on network effectiveness, the 
authors argued that integration among a subset of agencies in decentralized networks was positively 
related to network performance, hence showing that centralized integration through a central core 
agency, which is organizing, coordinating and monitoring activities of involved participants, is not the 
only path towards successful public networks, but that a high degree of integration among a subset of 
participants in decentralized network settings with widely scattered members can also enable the 
network to perform (Provan and Sebsatian 1998). Hence, we derive following two hypotheses: 
 
H1: Centralization positively affects network outcomes 
H2: In decentralized networks, higher degrees of integration among network participants are 
positively affecting network outcomes 
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Formalization. The importance of formalized rules and written contracts for organizing and 
coordinating complex systems is known since Max Weber’s “Economy and Society” published in 1922. 
Weber defined formalized rules, contractual agreements and regulated decision-making processes as 
mechanisms to ensure reliability, impartiality, and fairness, as well as uniform service-delivery to the 
public. Own research has shown that the function of such coordination mechanisms did not change ever 
since. Several qualitative analyses have revealed that decentralized networks successfully used 
formalized coordination mechanisms to define the relationships among network participants and specify 
and assign tasks as well as responsibilities to certain agencies in order to coordinate joint efforts towards 
a common goal. In this sense, formalization is used to ensure reliable and uniform service-delivery to the 
public in network settings that through a widely scattered structure of participants had problems 
coordinating otherwise. Furthermore, such contractual agreements and formalized network rules are 
often used as a basis to divide decision-making competences horizontally and equally among a broader 
set of network participants. Interestingly enough, formalized coordination mechanisms do not play an 
important role for the coordination of common efforts in centralized network settings, where 
organization and coordination of joint efforts was performed by a central core agency (Cristofoli et al. 
2014a; Cristofoli et al. 2014b; Cristofoli and Markovic 2014). 
Apart from own research, there is also evidence in the literature that formalized network rules, 
written agendas, well-organized network meetings and contractual agreements can improve public 
network performance by facilitating coordination processes within the network, binding decision 
alternatives and assist planning through greater levels of reliability (Brown et al. 1998; Jennings and 
Ewalt 1998). Furthermore, Provan and Kenis (2008) suggest that certain decentralized or centralized 
network governance structures can rely either on well-defined and formalized coordination mechanisms, 
or on more informal relations and spontaneous agreements between network participants in order to 
73 
 
facilitate coordination of joint activities towards the realization of common goals. Combining evidence 
from own research with the state of art within the field we derive our third hypothesis: 
 
H3: In decentralized networks, higher degrees of formalization are positively affecting network 
outcomes 
 
Network Management. Network management is most probably the best studied concept within the 
literature on public networks. As mentioned above, the idea that effective network management can help 
to organize and coordinate common efforts and therefore positively affect network outcomes is 
widespread (Kickert et al 1997; Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Meier and O’Toole 2001). Consequently, 
many scholars have emphasized the importance of effective network management over other aspects. 
The general discourse on network management is quite diverse and comprises discussions of managerial 
roles, network management activities and managerial strategies, even though the analytical distinction 
between activities and strategies can sometimes become unclear. The concept itself has evolved from a 
very personified understanding of a network manager who nurtures and/or steers the network towards 
the accomplishment of goals, to a more functional concept of network management where the employed 
activities, strategies respectively, are expected to impact positively on network outcomes, regardless of 
whether they were applied by a single person in charge, the almighty network manager, or a variety of 
persons that commonly or interchangeably take responsibility of network management. The simplest 
definition of network management has been provided by Klijn and colleagues, which define it as: “The 
deliberate attempt to govern processes in networks […]” (Klijn et al. 2010a: 1065). While many 
different managerial activities have been discussed in the literature that fit this simple definition of 
network management, we can synthesize them into three broader categories: facilitation, mediation and 
leadership (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Shortell et al. 2002). These three 
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broader patterns of managerial action include the guidance of network processes, as well as the framing 
of the institutional environment, which has been also labelled as “meta-governance” (Sørensen and 
Torfing 2009), and can be seen as a promising abstract resemblance of what is being discussed under the 
term network management. 
First, facilitating refers to the creation of an institutional environment that favors partner interaction 
by implementing and possibly readapting operating rules within which collaboration can effectively take 
place and by changing prevalent values and norms, as well as the perceptions within the network if 
necessary (Kickert et al. 1997; Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Koopenjan and Klijn 2004). Second, 
mediating refers to easing tensions among network participants and building up commitment among 
network members in order to strengthen partnerships between them by seeking formal adjustments 
through bargaining and negotiations, by rearranging network structural processes and by building 
governance mechanisms, which align the interests of partner organizations (Kickert et al. 1997; Agranoff 
and McGuire 2001). Finally, leadership refers to developing a vision, selecting and activating 
appropriate actors and resources for the network, mobilizing network members and pushing them 
towards the achievement of developed visions and goals by being impartial, gaining trust and building 
consensus and commitment for the cause (Klijn 1996; Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Brown et al. 1998; 
Shortell et al. 2002). 
The overall positive effect of managerial activities on network outcomes is well shown through 
plenty of studies (e.g. Meier and O’Toole 2001; Klijn et al. 2010a; Kort and Klijn 2011; Steijn et al. 
2011). While this general effect is not contested, those studies have not tried to understand how network 
management affects network outcomes in different network structures. In this respect, own research has 
revealed that while network management is of major importance for the organization and coordination of 
joint efforts in centralized network settings, it is of less significance in decentralized network settings, 
which rather rely on formalized coordination mechanisms due to specific contingencies those networks 
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have to meet (Cristofoli and Markovic 2014). Such evidence has been also supported by theoretical 
reasoning brought forward by Provan and Kenis (2008) arguing that if the task requires significant 
interdependencies among network members different governance forms (decentralized or centralized) 
require different network-level coordination competencies. In that case decentralized shared governance 
systems will likely underperform “since demands will be placed on individual network members for 
skills they may not possess”, whereas centralized governance system will likely perform well due to 
developed specialist skills related to network-level needs (Provan and Kenis 2008: 240f.). 
 
H4: In centralized network settings, the positive effect of managerial activities on network outcomes 
is expected to be stronger than in decentralized network settings 
 
Trust. Considering the discourse on trust in the classic network literature stemming from 
organizational studies, trust has been seen as an essential organizing principle for networks to perform 
well (Powell 1990; Uzzi 1997; among others). The idea that trust is a major organizing principle in 
network settings goes back to the notion that markets, hierarchies, and networks coexist, and make use of 
different logics, which make these three mechanisms of resource allocation more or less suitable in 
varying circumstances. However, only recently the literature on public networks has started to pay 
attention to trust as an organizing principle in public networks (Edelenbros and Klijn 2007; Klijn et al. 
2010b: Nolte and Boenigk 2011; Provan and Kenis 2008). Yet, compared to the importance that the 
concept of trust gained in other fields, it seems understudied in the context of public networks, which is 
surprising as it is supposed to be important in situations of high uncertainty (Klijn et al. 2010b). Trust 
itself is a multidimensional concept. The broader literature on trust seems to agree on three 
characteristics that allow to give a definition of the concept: vulnerability, risk and expectations (ibid.). 
Klijn and colleagues, scholars within the public network literature that have engaged in greater efforts to 
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discover the effects of trust in network settings, define trust as willingness to assume a vulnerable 
position by expecting that another actor will refrain from opportunistic behavior without a guarantee that 
the other party will in fact act behave as expected. Hence, trust is especially important in unpredictable 
and risky situations, since actors have less formed expectations about the behavior of the other party 
(Klijn et al. 2010b). Therefore, trust is expected to be an important organizing principle in network 
settings with increasing complexities, horizontal relationships and less predictability of outcomes. In this 
sense, Edelenbros and Klijn (2007) showed that higher levels of trust are positively related with better 
network level outcomes and argued that trust facilitates cooperation by reducing uncertainty and by 
saving transaction costs. Furthermore, trust solidifies cooperation by enhancing investments and stability 
in relations, and enhances network level outcomes by stimulating learning, knowledge exchange and 
innovation. Interestingly, in a subsequent study by the same group of researcher, trust still positively 
affected network outcomes (this time perceived outcomes), but the effect was weakened (yet still 
statistically significant) when network management strategies were included into the model. The authors 
concluded that network management strategies (especially the number of strategies employed) and trust 
distinctively affect network outcomes (Klijn et al. 2010b). 
In 2008, Provan and Kenis made an interesting contribution to the discussion on the role and 
importance of trust in network settings, connecting the concept of trust with certain structural arguments. 
These authors argue that network governance, which can be either decentralized and shared among 
participant, or centralized and executed by a central core agency, must be consistent with the general 
level of trust density that occurs across the network as a whole. Thus, in some specific network settings 
(decentralized, shared governance settings) trust ties must be dense, so that perceptions of trust are 
shared among and between network members, whereas other network settings (centralized governance 
settings) can function well even when the trust density, i.e. the amount of at least dyadic trust-based ties, 
is low. (Provan and Kenis 2008). “In the absence of this [a dense web of trust-based ties], shared 
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governance will not be effective since there will be little basis for collaboration among network 
members. When low-density trust is prevalent, networks can still be effective and be a viable form of 
accomplishing collective goals. However, under this circumstance, network governance is likely to be 
brokered, either through a lead organization or through an NAO” (Provan and Kenis 2008: 10). 
 
H5: The level of trust within in a network is positively affecting network outcomes 
H6: In decentralized network settings, the effect of trust on network outcomes is stronger than in 
centralized settings 
 
The reviewed literature brought up hypotheses about the effects of varying organizing principles 
(formalization, trust and network management) and how their effects might be distinct in varying 
network structures. The state of the art within the literature and the results of own research have 
motivated us to investigate whether different organizing principles, such as trust, formalization and 
network management, are contingent upon the degree of network centralization. Answering this question 
may shed light on the underlying contingencies between network structure and organizing principles in 
public network research. 
 
Empirical Setting 
Public networks set up by Swiss cantons and municipalities to deliver ambulant health- and social 
care services provided the empirical setting. These ambulant health and social care services are an 
essential part of the Swiss healthcare system, providing services to the big majority of the elderly at their 
homes, thereby increasing patients comfort and reducing costs to the healthcare system. The 
responsibility to organize the delivery of these services either lies at the cantonal level, or has been 
delegated to the municipalities. However, almost never do governmental entities provide these services 
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themselves. They rather set up specific organizations in forms of consortia or foundations. Those 
contracted, private non-profit organizations provide some core services by their own and usually activate 
other no-profit organizations (e.g. the Swiss Red Cross, collaborating nursing homes, or collaborating 
specialized physicians) to provide ancillary services, as for example transportation of disabled clients, 
meal-services for those unable to cook, night care, oncological care and psychological support. In this 
way, a public network emerges, including the canton, the municipalities, the established focal 
organization as an administrative and professional organization managing the network and providing the 
majority of services, and other non-profit organizations in charge of the delivery of complementary 
services. Each of these non-profit organizations providing complementary services is usually an 
independent organizational entity with own competences and specializations. The emerging networks are 
being called “Spitex networks”. With their provided services, Spitex networks support clients of all age 
groups, who need medical aid, care, supervision, monitoring or advice for their capability to life at home 
while receiving specific treatment or assistance. The idea behind Spitex networks is that patients are 
treated, supported and advised by special trained nurses in a known environment. The aim is to increase 
patients’ comfort, autonomy and self-determination. Furthermore, such services offered at the patient’s 
home are considered to be less cost-intensive than treatments in stationary facilities like hospital or 
nursing homes. In this way, the offered homecare services became an essential part of total health- and 
social care system in Switzerland. 
Due to the federalist culture and structure in Switzerland, the 26 Swiss cantons had plenty of scope 
for legally framing the options for the municipalities to organize the mode of homecare service-delivery 
according to cantonal, regional, political, and cultural contexts, and also according to different traditions 
of governments guaranteeing public service-delivery and specific fiscal constraints. In some cantons, the 
government directly activates the actors involved in the provision of home-care assistance (Spitex and 
no-profit organizations); in other cantons, the government or various municipalities delegate(s) the 
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responsibility to provide services, activate other actors when necessary, and administer and coordinate 
the resulting network to the focal Spitex organization; in other cantons again, the government entrusts 
the Spitex organization with the responsibility to provide services, activate other actors, administer and 
manage the network, but the Spitex organization splits its organizational structure into an headquarter 
administering and coordinating the network, and some subsidiaries providing services and activating no-
profit organizations when necessary. For example, during our qualitative research we identified three 
particular modes of service-delivery of ambulant health and social care in Switzerland. They differ in the 
degree of regional aggregation, public funding, centralization, and the use of certain organizing 
principles to coordinate efforts of network participants. These three modes are mostly shaped by 
cantonal legislature and represent the typical modes that can be found in Switzerland: (1) municipality-
based networks; (2) regional networks; and (3) cantonal networks. These different modes can be 
attributed to the three linguistic parts in Switzerland and are an expression of cantonal, regional and local 
peculiarities. As a result, Spitex networks were implemented with the same purpose and goal, but in 
varying contextual circumstances, with varying structural characteristics and relying on a plurality of 
organizing principles. Hence, Switzerland and the set up public networks covering different 
municipalities in different cantons are a rich empirical setting to analyze contingencies between network 
structure and organizing principles and their effect on network outcomes, since it allows to understand 
whether specific network arrangements proof more effective to achieve stated goals and fulfil the public 
assignment. In this way, the given variation on contextual, structural, functioning and managerial 
characteristics, and the equally given goals and public assignments provide a rare opportunity for 
scientific research.  
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Method 
Data were conducted from a survey to test the derived hypotheses. We distributed the questionnaire 
to 523 directors of the focal Spitex organizations, which could either be operating at the cantonal, 
regional or municipal level. We received 265 questionnaires and obtained a response rate of about 50 %. 
The directors were asked questions about contextual, structural and functioning characteristics as well as 
the managerial activities that were used to coordinate the efforts of network participants. Furthermore, 
we measured our outcome variable trough questions that allow us to understand each networks 
performance as perceived by the director of the focal organization. 
 
Network Outcomes. The outcome of interest was measured using perceived outcomes as an 
approximate evaluation. As Provan and Milward discussed in 2001, overall network performance can be 
assessed on three different levels, the community-, the network-, and the organizational level. At these 
three levels different stakeholders are of importance for the evaluation of network performance. 
Following Provan and Milward (2001) we measured network performance at the network level using the 
defined effectiveness criteria provided by the authors. In detail, we went through the definition of 
performance at the network level and the subjective effectiveness criteria (such as the growth of the 
range of provided services, the integration and coordination of services and the strength of the 
relationships) and defined four items (Cronbach’s Alpha= .869) and asked the respondents whether they 
agree or not on a scale from 1 to 7 (1 equal to “I totally disagree” and 7 equal to “I totally agree”). After 
collecting the data, we performed an Exploratory Factor Analysis, which revealed that all four items 
loaded on one single dimension (factor loadings > .75). Thus, having ensured the reliability of our 
measurement instrument we created an index variable out of the four answers given by the respondents 
and used that variable in our statistical analyses. 
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Table 1. Network Outcomes – Component Matrix and Cronbach’s Alpha 
Network Outcomes Component  
1  
The number of partner organizations involved in the homecare provision grew over time .756  
The relationship to the partner organizations we collaborated with became stronger .774  
The range of services we provided grew due to the collaboration with other organizations .849  
Services from different organizations were better coordinated and integrated because of the .868  
collaboration   
N of items = 4 Cronbach’s  
 α = .869  
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis, Eigenvalues >1. One component extracted. 
 
Centralization. Accroding to Provan and Milward “centralization describes the extent to which […] 
cohesion is organized around particular focal points” (Provan and Milward 1995: 10). In this respect, 
the concept refers to the “power and control structure of a network” that is emerging around a focal 
organization when network links, coordinative activities and other moments of direct interaction are 
bound to one particular network participant. We followed the definition provided by Provan and 
Milward and measured to which extent network links, coordinative activities and other moments of 
direct interaction are bound to a central core agency. Thus, instead of measuring the network 
centralization directly through surveying every network participant about the link to other organizations, 
we followed a similar approach as Brown et al. (1998), surveying single network participants, in our case 
the director of the organization delivering the core services, about the existence of an agency that 
interacts with all other network participants, coordinates their activities and takes decisions regarding the 
network. We developed seven items (Cronbach’s Alpha= .942) and asked the respondents to indicate 
whether they agree or not on a scale from 1 to 7 (1 equal to “I totally disagree” and 7 equal to “I totally 
agree”). Again, we performed an Exploratory Factor Analysis, which revealed that all seven items load 
on one single dimension (factor loadings > .8). After ensuring the reliability of our measurement 
instrument we created an index variable out of the seven answers given by the respondents and used that 
variable in our statistical analyses. 
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Table 2. Centralization – Component Matrix and Cronbach’s Alpha 
 
Centralization Component  
1  
There is one central organization (including my Spitex) with which all the organizations interact .843  
There is one central organization (including my Spitex) that plays a central role in coordinating .898  
the activity of all the other partner organizations   
There is one central organization (including my Spitex) that is in contact with all the other .886  
partner organizations   
There is one central organization (including my Spitex) that has relationships with all the other .885  
partner organizations   
There is one central organization (including my Spitex) that plays a central role in .843  
administering the activity of all the other partner organizations   
There is one central organization (including my Spitex) that plays a central role in governing .864  
the activity of all the other partner organizations   
There is one central organization (including my Spitex) that activates all the other partner .819  
organizations   
N of items = 7 Cronbach’s  
 α = .942  
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis, Eigenvalues >1. One component extracted 
 
Integration. In general terms, network integration describes to which extent all network 
organizations are interconnected or linked to each other. (Provan and Milward 1995). We defined four 
items to measure network integration (Cronbach’s Alpha= .86) and asked the respondents to which 
extent they agree to the defined statements on a scale from 1 to 7 (1 equal to “I totally disagree” and 7 
equal to “I totally agree”). An Exploratory Factor Analysis showed that all items loaded on one single 
dimension, with the factor loadings being relatively high (factor loadings > .77). 
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Table 3. Integration – Component Matrix and Cronbach’s Alpha 
 
Integration Component  
1  
The partner organizations of my Spitex, normally contact each other, regardless the Spitexs’ .858  
activity, if this is necessary to improve the provision of their services   
The partner organizations of my Spitex, normally interact to provide their services, .907  
regardless the relationship with my Spitex   
The partner organizations of my Spitex collaborate with each other for the provisioning of .818  
homecare services   
Relationships exist among the partner organizations of my Spitex .773  
N of items = 4 Cronbach’s  
 α = .86  
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis, Eigenvalues >1. One component extracted. 
 
Formalization. Following the study of Brown et al. (1998) we measured the degree of formalization 
by defining survey items and let the respondents express whether the means of coordination and 
interaction are rather formalized or informal. We developed three items (Cronbach’s Alpha= .763) and 
let the respondents indicate whether the means of coordination and interaction are considered to be 
informal or formal on a scale from 1 “informal” to 7 “formal”. After collecting the data we performed an 
Exploratory Factor Analysis which revealed that all three items load on a single dimension with the 
factor loadings being sufficiently high (factor loadings > .8). Again, we created an index variable out of 
the three items and used that index in our statistical analyses. 
 
Table 4. Formalization – Component Matrix and Cronbach’s Alpha 
 
Formalization 
Component  
1  
My  Spitex  relies  on  agreements  that  spell  out  relationships  between  partners.  These 
agreements are… .810  
My Spitex relies on communication channels when contacting partner organizations about issues 
related to the homecare. These are… .819  
To coordinate each other’s activities in the collaboration my Spitex and its partner relies on 
agreements. These agreements are… .843  
N of items = 3 Cronbach’s 
α =.763 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis, Eigenvalues >1. One component extracted. 
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Trust. Trust is a multidimensional concept, which can sometimes be difficult to measure. Klijn and 
colleagues mention five different dimensions of trust: agreement trust, benefit of the doubt, reliability, 
absence of opportunistic behavior and goodwill trust (Klijn et al. 2010b). Instead of defining several 
items for each dimension, we asked the respondents to provide a general rating of the degree of trust 
among network participants collaborating to deliver health- and social care services by choosing a 
number from 1 to 10. 
Trust 
 
 
If you had to give a number rating the degree of trust between the partner organizations collaborating with your 
Spitex for the provision of homecare assistance, with what number would you rate it (Give a number from 1 to 10 
whereby number 1 is the lowest score and 10 the highest score)?  
 
Network Management. Following the definitions provided by the literature (Agranoff and McGuire 
2001; Agranoff and McGuire 1999; Kickert et al. 1997, among others) we have derived three 
respectively four items per defined activity, i.e. facilitating, mediating, and leadership, to evaluate 
whether managerial activities were employed in each network. We asked the respondents to indicate 
whether that activity was performed by nobody, institutional bodies, or the Spitex management, as it is 
often the focal organization to manage the common efforts of network participants. Subsequently we 
performed several factor analyses in order to extract the items measuring an activity in its best way. 
Therefore, we selected the items with the lowest cross-loadings and obtained two items per activity. In 
order to appreciate the general use of network management activities, we summed the average responses 
to these six items and created an index, the independent variable network management. After ensuring 
that the newly created scale is sufficiently reliable (Cronbach’s Alpha= .795), we used the generated 
index variable to appreciate the overall effect of network management (consisting out of three 
concepts/activities) on network outcomes. 
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Table 5. Network Management – Rotated Component Matrix and Cronbach’s Alpha 
 
Network Management 
 Component  
F 
 
M L 
 
   
Defining the operating rules to favour the partner collaboration .895     
Defining the framework of rules within which the partner collaboration can take place .861     
Helping the partner organizations to collaborate regardless their contrasting interests   .901   
Acting as a mediator and broker (of interests/points of view) among the partner   .787   
organizations      
Forging an agreement among the partner organizations on the role and support of    .650  
the network activities      
Lead all the partner organizations towards a common objective    .943  
N of items = 6 Cronbach’s α = .795  
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis, Eigenvalues >.7. Rotation Method:Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
Rotation converged in 4 iterations. Factor loadings <.45 suppressed for better visualization. 
 
Controls. In order to arrive at good causal inference using statistical analyses, we need to control for 
confounders, i.e. for variables that have an effect on our independent variables as specified above and 
our dependent variable – network outcomes. In a vast majority of statistical analyses, it is impossible to 
control for all possible confounders. Therefore, it has to be the goal to control for confounders with the 
biggest effect on the independent and the dependent variables, since these confounders present the 
biggest threat to causal inference using statistical analyses. However, these confounders are usually 
easier to spot and often have been subject to previous investigation. Thus, in order to arrive at a list of 
possible important confounders we screened the literature and extracted control variables. Table 6 
provides a summary of control variables that have been extracted and how these controls have been 
operationalized in order to use them in our statistical analyses. 
Finally, in order to test our hypotheses we centered the independent variables, built interaction terms 
and checked for multicollinearity (VIF <1.3). 
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Table 6. Control Variables 
 
Controls Source Definition Operationalization 
 
 
S
iz
e
 
Provan and Kenis 
2008 
Number of 
network 
participants 
Please indicate with how many organizations 
you usually collaborate to deliver home- and 
social care services 
 
 
 
C
a
tc
h
m
e
n
t 
A
re
a
 
 
Population 
living in the 
designated area 
Please indicate how many citizens live in the  
area that your Spitex is supposed to serve   
 
 
 
A
u
to
n
o
m
y
 
Pollitt et al. 2004; 
Kort and Klijn 2011 
Degree to which 
discretionary 
powers to make 
independent 
decision exist 
To which extent does your organizations have he power 
to make decisions about…  
…the provision of homecare services  
…the definition of its own mission and vision  
…the definition of its own mid- and long term programs  
…the definition of its own objectives  
…the collaboration with other organizations  
(scale adapted from Kort/Klijn 2011)  
D
is
a
g
g
re
g
a
ti
o
n
 
Pollitt et al. 2004; 
Kort and Klijn 2011 
Degree of 
structural 
separation from 
public entities 
A clear framework was set up by  
municipalities/canton  that determined the tasks  
at hand for our organization  
The control by the municipalities/canton is tight  
The municipalities/canton want to be frequently  
informed on the progress of our activities  
(scale adapted from Kort/Klijn 2011)  
C
o
n
tr
o
l Provan/Milward 
1995 
Meier and O’Toole 
2004 
Direct, 
unfragmented 
external control 
Please indicate which of these entities usually control 
the activities of your organization (list of seven 
institutions  + else option provided) 
 
F
in
a
n
c
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l 
R
e
s
o
u
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e
s
 
Provan and Milward 
1995 
Availability of 
financial 
resources in the 
environment 
Percentage of public funding provided by 
municipalities/canton 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Results 
In order to test our six hypotheses we used several standard OLS Regressions. Tables 7  and 8 
present the results of that analysis. Model 1 is the baseline equation with all control variables, while 
Model 2 introduces our derived independent variables: centralization; integration; formalization; 
management and trust. It shows that centralization has a significant positive effect on network outcomes, 
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as well as integration, formalization and trust. Building on the previous model, model 3 introduces the 
interaction terms between centralization and integration, formalization, management as well as trust. 
Considering Model 3 the reader can see that integration and formalization as well as trust are still 
statistical significant predictors of network performance. However, the interaction among centralization 
and formalization is negative significant, while centralization and management is positive significant. 
Thus, formalization and management have distinct effects depending on whether they are mediated by 
centralization. 
 
Table 7. Results of Regression Analyses 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Size  .200 **  .221 ***  .211 *** 
Catchment Area -.117 * -.079 -.066 
Autonomy  .048  -.038 -.030 
Disaggregation  .147 **  .019  .037 
Control  .095  .076  .053 
Financial Resources -.073 -.075 -.062 
    
Centralization    .131 **  .096 
Integration    .180 **  .161 ** 
Formalization    .195 ***  .221 *** 
Management   .000  .026 
Trust    .243 ***  .238 *** 
    
Centralization_Integration   -.060 
Centralization_Formalization   -.129 ** 
Centralization_Management    .189 ** 
Centralization_Trust    .050 
    
R2  .074  .252  .289 
 
Standardized Coefficients; * p< 0.1; ** p< 0.05; *** p< 0.01; reflected and log-transformed dependent variable 
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Figure 1 shows the differences for the effect of network management on network outcomes along 
three groups of low, moderate and highly centralized networks. 
 
Figure 1. Effect of Network Management on Outcomes by Centralization 
 
Following Model 3 and Figure 1, we performed further regression analyses using fully interactive 
models among the least centralized 1/3 of the sample (Model 4) and the most centralized 1/3 of the 
sample (Model 5), in order to unwrap the varying effects of integration, formalization, network 
management and trust in centralized and decentralized networks. These two models draw a clearer 
picture of the varying effects of different organizing principles in public networks. The results of the 
89 
 
performed analyses support most of derived hypotheses. Regarding the control variables, network size 
had a positive significant effect on network outcomes throughout all models, while broader control has a 
positive significant effect on network outcomes in decentralized networks. Regarding the effects of 
defined independent variables, Model 4 shows that in the group of the least centralized networks higher 
degrees of integration among network participants is positively affecting network outcomes. Hence, we 
fail to reject hypothesis H2. Further, considering the varying effect of formalization in decentralized 
networks (Model 4) and in centralized networks (Model 5), results show that in decentralized networks 
higher degrees of formalization are positively affecting network outcomes. Again, we fail to reject 
hypothesis H3. Hypothesis H4 suggested a positive association between network management in 
centralized network settings that is stronger than in decentralized networks. Table 8, Figure 1 and the 
comparison between Model 4 and Model 5 indicates that there is a significant positive effect of network 
management on network performance in centralized networks, while it is negative and significant in 
decentralized network settings. In this respect, we fail to reject hypothesis H4. The last two hypotheses 
concern the effect of trust. Hypothesis H5 proposed a positive relationship between the level of trust an 
network performance, while hypothesis H6 proposed a stronger positive relationship in decentralized 
networks than in centralized networks. The results represented by Model 4 and Model 5 show that a 
significant positive association between trust and network performance exists, and further that this 
relationship is stronger in decentralized networks (Model 4) than in centralized networks (Model 5). 
Finally, it seems important to highlight that by analyzing the effects of formalization, network 
management and trust with fully interactive models in decentralized and centralized network settings, we 
were able to account for a higher explained variance in Model 4 and Model 5, providing the notion of 
distinct organizing principles in varying structural settings further support. 
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Table 8. Results of Regression Analyses for Groups 
 Model 4 Model 5 
Size  .212 **  .226 * 
Catchment Area -.082 -.067 
Autonomy -.103  .123 
Disaggregation  .045 -.004 
Control  .263 ** -.035 
Financial Resources -.050  .037 
   
Centralization  .008  .145 
Integration  .269 **  .028 
Formalization  .292 **  .079 
Management -.261 **  .297 ** 
Trust  .278 **  .237 ** 
   
R2 .380  .326 
 
Standardized Coefficients; * p< 0.1; ** p< 0.05; *** p< 0.01; Log-transformed dependent variable 
 
Discussion 
Starting from the literature we identified three different organizing playing an important role for the 
governance of public networks. While the effect of trust on network outcomes seems to be positive in 
centralized and decentralized network settings, the effect and therefore the importance of formalization 
and network management as organizing principles is contingent upon the given network structure. Thus, 
we identified two broader organizing principles that have significantly varying effects on outcomes 
measured at the network level. One organizing principle, i.e. the contractual definition of relationships, 
roles, responsibilities, boundaries and communication channels, in short the bureaucratic coordination of 
common efforts, has shown to have positive effects in decentralized networks settings, while another 
organizing principle, the use of managerial activities to organize and coordinate the activities of network 
participants has shown positive effects on network outcomes in a setting in which the “power and 
control structure of a network” (Provan and Milward 1995: 10) is organized around one a focal 
91 
 
organization. In this respect the power and control structure network management seems to be key to the 
understanding of obtained results. In decentralized networks the network power and control structure is 
complex, since it is often shared among multiple horizontally dispersed but powerful network 
participants (Cristofoli and Markovic 2014). In such situations higher integration (H2) among those 
members that have a stake and higher degrees of formalization of contracts, agreements and 
communication channels (H3) form a basis to coordinate joint efforts towards a common goal. Network 
participants then make use of a bureaucratic approach in order to organize, coordinate and direct network 
participants towards a common goal in accordance with established rules and procedures. On the other 
hand, centralized networks with a central core agency operate in a context where the governance 
structure provides significant power asymmetries. These power asymmetries occur either through core 
providers assuming a leading role in the network bolstered by their central position in the flow of clients 
and key resources or through inception by legal authorities that establish a Network Administrative 
Organization to coordinate and sustain a network (Provan and Kenis 2008). In such situations, public 
networks tend to rely less on formalized mechanisms to organize, coordinate and direct network 
participants towards a common goal in accordance with established rules and procedures. To the 
contrary, the central core agency possesses a certain scope to actively engage in steering and nurturing 
the network with its managerial abilities. Formalization as a guiding principle of organizing and 
coordinating the efforts of more or less equal network participants with own agendas towards a common 
goal turns obsolete and is being replaced by managerial activities, typically performed by the most 
central node in the network. Thus, centralized networks seem to make use of their enhanced access to 
resources and greater legitimacy providing them with a certain authority to steer and nurture the network 
in a top-down manner. At this point, it seems interesting to recall Powell (1990) and his typology of 
markets, hierarchies and networks. Even though networks are clearly contrasted to market and 
hierarchical governance structures, the author mentions mixed forms of “status hierarchies” and “formal 
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rules” within networks. Our research pointed us to the existence of such mixed types. On the one hand, 
we have found a significant positive effect of formal rules on network performance in decentralized 
networks and argued that networks with a complex power and control structure, due to widely scattered 
network participants taking commonly part in the governance of the network, make use of formal rules 
in order to organize and coordinate the efforts of network participants towards a common goal. On the 
other hand, we have argued that in centralized networks the central core agency employs its authority 
based on greater legitimacy, better access to resources respectively, and governs the entire network by 
exerting influence through managerial activities. 
In this sense, we can argue that there is not one best way of organizing common efforts to seek the 
achievement of certain goals, but that in different network environments, varying structures and diverse 
organizing principles may lead to success. Hence, there are rather multiple configurations of 
determinants, which have to be combined in a meaningful manner in order to foster network 
performance (Cristofoli and Markovic 2014). Each configuration is to be based coherently on the 
organizing principles in place, which in turn are contingent upon the network structure. These arguments 
are in line with the literature, as Provan and Milward (1995) and later Raab et al. (2013) have pointed out 
that network effectiveness is highest if the coordination of partner interaction towards a common goal, is 
achieved through centralized integration, in other words network centralization, and not simultaneously 
through a high degree of density among network participants, since this might impose two contradictory 
coordination logics13. These competing coordination logics, or as we called it here “organizing 
principles”, make systems “unnecessarily complex and inefficient”, since the resources that go into 
creating and maintaining redundant ties will adversely affect efficiency (Raab et al. 2013). 
                                                          
13 However, networks that are centralized through a central core agency are at the same time also more likely to have built 
certain managerial capacities in terms of network level coordination competencies and are therefore more likely to perform 
well due to developed speciality skills related to network-level needs (H4) (Provan and Kenis 2008). 
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Apart from these key findings, this paper sheds light on another interesting relationship. We were 
able to show that trust has a positive effect on network outcomes (H5) almost regardless of the actual 
structural setting of a network (H6). In line with the scarce literature, trust seems to have a strong 
relation with performance in public network by reducing transaction costs, increasing predictability of 
partners’ strategies, reducing possibilities for opportunism and thereby enhancing the chances for 
collaboration between actors (Edelenbros and Klijn 2007). This result is of exceptional interest, since 
there has been no study that analyzed the effect of trust on public network performance in varying 
network structures. Unlike other organizing principles governing in public networks, trust seems to have 
nearly a universal positive effect in varying network structures. It functions as a lubricant for the 
relationships among the numerous actors pursuing various interests. In this sense we would like to recall 
Edelenbros et al. 2012 who argued that network management seems to find its real impact on network 
outcomes through trust creation and therefore through perceived trust among actors in public networks. 
These authors attribute a stabilizing effect to trust, arguing that it reduces uncertainty stemming from 
value conflicts among separate actors and subsequent strategic actions. Even in those situations where 
value conflicts and various interests are initially met with bureaucratic means, i.e. by high levels of 
formalization in order to reduce unpredictability, increase reliability, and thereby safeguard stability, 
trust is not negatively affected (Isett and Provan 2005). To the contrary, it is very likely to lead to more 
intense relationships as well as increased multiplexity among network participants, and is therefore 
beneficial for network performance (ibid.). Hence, the co-existence of formalization and trust governing 
participant interaction in public networks is not a paradox; it rather shows the importance of trust as 
universal guiding principle in public networks. Apart from formalization in decentralized power and 
control structures and network management in centralized network settings, trust-based ties among 
several actors pursuing various agendas is of highest significance for establishing a basis that allows to 
organize and coordinate common efforts to secure the achievement of a mutual goal. 
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Conclusion 
There are multiple, logically coherent organizing principles within successful interorganizational 
public networks. One organizing principle, i.e. the contractual definition of relationships, roles, 
responsibilities, boundaries and communication channels (in short the bureaucratic coordination of 
common efforts), has shown to have positive effects in decentralized networks settings, while another 
organizing principle, the use of managerial activities to organize and coordinate the activities of network 
participants has shown positive effects on network outcomes in a setting in which the “power and 
control structure of a network” (Provan and Milward 1995: 10) is organized around one focal 
organization. Furthermore, there is evidence that breaking with the inherent logics of each network 
might affect network performance negatively as the application of network management activities in 
decentralized network settings is highly negatively related with network performance. Referring back to 
the start of our paper, we believe to have shown that different network structures rely on varying 
organizing principles and that it is necessary to integrate evidence regarding managerial steering, 
bureaucratic coordination, structural arrangements of networks and the role of trust in order to arrive at a 
more complete understanding of underlying contingencies and how they define the way public networks 
function. Given the evidence brought forward in this paper, we think that the widespread consensus that 
network management is paramount to success of public networks might be misleading. 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
The Irony of Networks 
As the public sector evolved through three distinct paradigms that shaped the nature of its regime, 
three resource allocation mechanisms, hierarchies, markets and networks, were used as instruments in 
order to organize and coordinate policy design, policy implementation and public service delivery. 
During the preeminent era of the traditional Public Administration model, the state and its administration 
were seen as the only entities responsible for the design of policies, their implementation and the 
delivery of services to the public. Hence, the traditional Public Administration model was built on 
vertical integration of units and an emphasis was placed on formal rules and procedures, which provided 
the bases for organizing and coordinating policy implementation and public service delivery through 
hierarchies embodied by bureaucracies. As that model reach its limits, the public sector evolved from a 
hierarchical model of organizing and coordinating its activities, to a more horizontal approach, where 
private and non-profit organizations increasingly participate in the design, formulation and 
implementation of public policy. Hierarchies between public and private entities have been replaced with 
rather horizontal relationships, in which the participants are partners in achieving effective outcomes 
(Mandell 1999a). Scholars have argued that in complex, plural and fragmented societies, horizontal 
partnerships ought to achieve more effective policy outcomes by using participative approaches 
(Agranoff 1992; Mandell 1999b). Nowadays, such horizontal partnerships are being structured in 
networks in order to find solutions for complex societal problems and ensure the provision of public 
services. Consequently, the structure of relationships among actors involved in such processes changed 
considerably. As public sector entities moved policy design, policy implementation and service delivery 
from hierarchies to networks, and thereby enlarged the number of participating entities as well as altered 
the structure of relationships among them, the practices applied in order to organize and coordinate 
within these new governance systems changed at the same time.    
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The above presented studies deal exactly with the question of how network structures interact with 
practices to organize and coordinate efforts of various public, private and non-profit entities and enable 
or constrain new governance systems to implement policies and provide services to the public. The first 
study “Governance, “management” and performance in public networks: How to be successful in 
shared-governance networks” was an attempt to explore the interaction between horizontally integrated 
network structures, where governance is shared among most participants, and bureaucratic means of 
coordination among involved entities as well as managerial intervention. The results have shown that 
despite a supposed flexibility and responsiveness to the needs of network participants (Kenis and Provan 
2009), success in networks with a shared-governance system seems to depend on the simultaneous 
reliance on formalized coordination mechanisms and the presence of “network administrators” that 
establish and maintain network rules and procedures (Cristofoli et al. 2014b). These network 
administrators adopt the role of bureaucrats and follow impersonal, legislated decision-making 
procedures in order to preserve a balance of power between the major network partners and thus, 
guarantee stability, accountability and goal attainment in complex networks characterized by a 
horizontally dispersed power and control structure. Accordingly, the function of these bureaucrats cannot 
be subsumed under the network management approaches described in the literature as facilitator, 
mediator and leader (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; 2003; McGuire 2002).  
The second study “How to make public networks really work. A Qualitative Comparative Analysis”, 
seeks to unwrap the complex causality among the network context, the network structure, formalized 
coordination mechanisms and managerial activities further. The results show that there a multiple 
configurational patterns leading to successful public networks. The first pattern consists of adequate 
funding, a decentralized and horizontal governance system, a high reliance on formal bureaucratic 
coordination mechanisms and the absence of managerial intervention. Confirming results from the first 
analysis, the study shows how successful shared-governance networks with a complex structure of 
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interorganizational relationships share the task of governing the network by taking a bureaucratic 
approach in order to organize, coordinate and direct network participants towards a common goal in 
accordance with established rules and procedures. Bureaucratic means become a guiding principle for 
the interaction among equal network participants with own agendas. The scope for managerial 
intervention is thus reduced to a minimum, while the reliance on formalized coordination mechanisms 
becomes a governing principle. 
Yet, this insight might be one that is only relevant for (mandated) service-delivery networks for two 
reasons. On the one hand, horizontally integrated public networks with a shared-governance system 
consist of rather autonomous organizations that are often independently funded by the public in order to 
provide services to citizens (Cristofoli and Markovic 2014). Hence, to preserve autonomy, competencies 
and thereby secure future public funding, formalized coordination mechanisms serve as means to define 
relationships, roles and responsibilities, and to establish a balance of power among the most important 
participants. On the other hand, research carried out on governance networks has shown that the more 
actors are participating in a horizontally structured network, the more complex the decision-making 
process is due to competing strategies and sudden changes in the environment or the participants’ 
preferences (Koopenjan and Klijn 2004).  While governance networks do not need to provide solutions 
to complex societal problems and value conflicts immediately, (mandated) service-delivery networks do 
have responsibilities towards citizens, which in most cases depend on a reliable, uniform and adequate 
delivery of services. Furthermore, unlike governance networks, service-delivery networks have often 
contractual obligations towards public entities (the government, the administration) that are defined in 
performance agreements, which foresee penalties if contractual obligations have not been fulfilled. 
Hence, these formalized rules, agreements, procedures and a regulated decision-making process serve as 
safeguards to the fulfillment of responsibilities and obligations towards the citizens and public entities.  
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Besides, the analysis revealed a second configuration leading towards high performance in public 
networks. The second pattern requires adequate funding, and combines centralized integration through 
core agencies with the direct application of managerial activities to organize and coordinate the various 
efforts of network participants successfully. For that, centralized networks exploit power asymmetries 
among participants that occur due to enhanced access to resources or greater legitimacy. While these 
networks tend to rely less on formalized mechanisms, power asymmetries provide the central core 
agency a certain scope to actively engage in steering and nurturing the network with their managerial 
abilities. In this way, successful centralized networks rely on vertical integration through hierarchies in 
order to organize and coordinate the network in a top-down manner.  
Finally, the last study “Contingencies and Organizing Principles in Public Networks” represents an 
empiric test of results obtained in pervious stages of the research process. It confirms on large scale the 
positive effect of bureaucratic means in decentralized networks and the positive effect of network 
management activities on network performance centralized settings.  Furthermore, the results show that 
the practices applied in order to organize and coordinate the efforts of network participants need to be 
coherently matched with the complexity of structure of relationships among network participants, as 
managerial practices have a strong and significant negative effect on performance in decentralized 
service-delivery networks. Lastly, obtained results also provide insights into the function of trust as 
lubricant of relationships among network participants in varying structural settings. Trust has a positive 
effect on network performance for both centrally integrated and horizontally structured network settings. 
Given previous considerations on the interorganizational relationships among network participants, it is 
not surprising that its effects are slightly stronger in complex networks characterized by a horizontally 
dispersed power and control structure, as the reduction of transaction costs, the greater predictability of 
partners’ strategies, and reduced opportunism are more functional in systems of independent equals with 
own agendas.   
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While the above presented research was conducted using three different methodological approaches 
and varying data sources, the results gained through a stepwise approach point to the same direction. 
They show that networks that adopt features of hierarchies function better. Two aspects constitute this 
particular irony of networks: First, in pluricentric networks with complex relationship structures among 
participants, horizontally integrated governance systems rely on practices primarily typical for 
hierarchies and on bureaucrats maintaining them in order to be successful. These insights are remarkable 
as they challenge the supposed flexibility and responsiveness of shared-governance networks (Provan 
and Kenis 2009). Second, networks with significant power asymmetries among participants developed 
certain characteristics of a hierarchical structure, which allow a small subset of participants to steer and 
nurture network activities in a top-down manner.      
Therefore, the sequential tripartite regime model, from the traditional Public Administration, 
through New Public Management, to the latest New Public Governance model, is a simplification 
(Osborne 2010). In the empirical world, we find elements of hierarchies, markets and networks 
coexisting and complementing each other. In a complex reality, hybrids of hierarchies, markets and 
networks develop and expand into new areas of application in order to find suitable and sustainable 
solutions to the old problem of organization, i.e. the question of how to get physically and cognitively 
limited independent actors to cooperate in order to overcome their boundaries and achieve a greater 
mutual goal through common efforts (to recall Barnard 1938; Simon 1947 and Thompson 1967). Given 
the increasing complexity of societal problems and value conflicts in a plural, fragmented and 
interorganizational environment (Osborne 2010), we can observe the introduction of new resource 
allocation mechanisms to the public sector, but also the recombination of new and existent structures and 
practices that allows to organize hierarchies, markets and networks. Yet, as this research has shown, only 
(re-) combinations that follow the idiosyncratic logics of each particular governance system can lead to 
satisfying outcomes.  
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